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"To protect those who are not able to protect themselves is a duty
which every one owes to society."'
"The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-
constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color. ' 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you have been arrested. Your physical liberty is yanked away,
your mental disposition uprooted. You have lost the freedom to move about
freely; you have entered the dark barracks of the criminal justice system.
After a quick release from the distressing confines of a jail cell, you proceed
to trial. You have been told that you may lose your child and your job.
More importantly, you fear losing your reputation and a lifetime of respect.
Upon being ushered into the courtroom, you suddenly remember hearing
from a distant relative (who had taken a course in constitutional law) about
the right to have a lawyer fight on your behalf if you cannot afford one. You
now confidently appear before the judge with this comforting and
encouraging thought in mind. You tell the judge you cannot afford a lawyer,
and you would like one appointed on your behalf. The judge bluntly denies
this request. You plead with him, but he brashly explains that the Sixth
Amendment does not require the state to appoint a lawyer to you ... at least
for this crime, and for this punishment. Severely disappointed by this
response, you have no choice but to slouch away and fearfully anticipate
your coming trial - a trial in which the state will have a competent lawyer on
their side, and you will not.
It has been over 210 years since the Constitution first solemnly
proclaimed that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel."3 Despite this seemingly broad
1. Jenoure v. Delmege, 60 L.J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 13 (1890). (quoting Edward Macnaghten, 1st
baron and English jurist).
2. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (quoting Jackson, J.).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). The Amendment reads in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
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and bold Sixth Amendment guarantee,4 its protection has not been realized
for all underprivileged criminal defendants. 5 It is evident that some criminal
defendants enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel: the rich, the famous,
and those convicted of felonies.6  The wide range of all criminal
prosecutions, however, covers a much broader spectrum. What about those
who cannot readily afford a lawyer? What about the thousands upon
thousands of misdemeanor charges that indigent defendants face each year?
The right to have representative counsel at your expense in any criminal
proceeding has scarcely been questioned.7 The constitutional right to have
appointed counsel argue on your behalf has seen much more troubled times.8
Obviously, this predicament mostly affects poor criminal defendants who
lack the resources to hire an effective advocate willing and able to meet the
prosecution's case. The disparity between the representation afforded to
affluent criminal defendants and the meager assistance of counsel granted to
indigent defendants has produced "one of the most embarrassing legal
quandaries in America."9 It can no longer be said that there is not a "direct
proportional relationship between the quality of representation one receives
and the size of their bank account."' 10
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Id.
4. See Martin R. Gardner, Criminal Law: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its
Underlying Values: Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397,
397 (2000) (reflecting that the right to counsel "has been described by leading commentators as the
central feature of our adversarial system").
5. See id. (finding that "'scholars, lawyers, and judges have often lost their way' in their
attempts to understand the Amendment's scope and underlying values") (quoting Akhil R. Amar,
Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 641 (1996)).
6. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) ("In criminal trials a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.").
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed Counsel in Criminal
Cases: The Route to True Equal Justice, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 48-49 (1997) (concluding that "[t]he
distance between the quality of representation that a wealthy person (or corporation) receives in a
criminal case and that received by an indigent person is scandalous .... No wealthy defendant has
ever been executed by governmental authorities in American history.").
10. Sonia Y. Lee, OC's PD's Feeling the Squeeze - The Right to Counsel: In Light of Budget
Cuts, Can the Orange Count) Office of the Public Defender Provide Effective Assistance of
Counsel?, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1895, 1896 (1996). Professor Clark explained the relationship
between wealth and quality of representation:
It is not that wealthy people (especially mob figures) have not committed crimes that are
indistinguishable from the crimes for which many poor or non-wealthy people have been
executed. It is simply that the wealthy defendants had the financial resources to purchase
the kind of defense that can blunt a prosecution for a capital crime or dissuade a
prosecutor from even pursuing such a penalty. Lawyers versed in the defense of capital
cases regularly report that poverty and the failure of adequate defense are the key
variables that determine whether the death penalty is imposed or actually carried out.
This sobering portrait of representation for a criminally accused appears
even more ominous keeping in mind the dearth of qualified attorneys willing
to represent indigent criminal defendants."' Underlying the many difficulties
accompanying this sorrowful situation is a fundamental question that must
be asked before attempting to solve this dilemma: when is an indigent
defendant constitutionally entitled to court appointed counsel? There are
certainly many important and legitimate concerns that attend the problem of
ineffective assistance of counsel for the poor once they are at trial, 2 but first
these indigents must be granted the right to merely have a trial lawyer by
their side. At what type of proceeding should indigent defendants be
allowed to reap the benefits of court appointed counsel? What types of
charges must be brought before they qualify for Sixth Amendment
protection? Who is going to pay for these court appointed lawyers? More
specifically, what type of criminal prosecution falls within the realm of "all
criminal prosecutions" as stated by the Sixth Amendment, so that an
indigent will be guaranteed a zealous advocate at the state's expense? 3 The
importance of a fair trial is held in the highest regard in the American justice
system, 14 and the necessity of a learned advocate on both sides is essential to
this process.15 Therefore, at what point does the difficulty in providing legal
assistance to indigent defendants outweigh the fundamental right to receive a
fair trial? In many jurisdictions, eighty to ninety percent of those citizens
charged with crimes are unable to afford private counsel.16  Given such
depressing figures, a sound determination of this issue is even more
imperative.
These are the questions that will be investigated in this article. Part II
will discuss the landmark Supreme Court cases dealing with the right to
counsel that lead up to the decision in Alabama v. Shelton. 7 Special
attention will be paid to the rationale behind these decisions, and the reasons
for recognizing the importance of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees. Part
III will discuss the Shelton decision itself and explore both the majority's
and the dissent's detailed logic in drafting the opinions. Part IV will expand
on the Court's recent departure from their prior Sixth Amendment
Clark, supra note 9, at 49-50.
11. See Stephen J. Schulhofer and David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting
Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice For All Criminal
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 93 (1993) (concerning the courts' abilities to conscript
unwilling defenders).
12. See discussion infra Part II.A. The most important of these concerns is the legal burden on
the defendant to prove this ineffective assistance of counsel.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58
MD. L. REV. 1393, 1404 (1999) ("If exonerating the innocent represents a significant goal of our
system of criminal procedure, this process must provide some means for evaluating whether the
defendant was competently and adequately represented at trial, so that an adversarial determination
of guilt indeed occurred").
15. See id.
16. Randolph N. Stone, The Role of State Funded Programs in Legal Representation of Indigent
Defendants in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 205, 211 (1993).
17. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
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jurisprudence and attempt to discover if the Shelton decision was enough to
bring it back on track. Part V will focus on the current state of affairs in
indigent criminal trials and the chorus of critical reviews accompanying it.
This will include the contemporary effects of uncounseled misdemeanors
and proposed solutions to the problem, as well as some criticisms of these
recent proposals and evidence of their failure. Part VI will conclude with a
difficult but "inescapable resolution," explaining why the Supreme Court
must continue to move forward and give full force to the language of the
Sixth Amendment. There are countless warning signals foretelling the
dangers of a restricted Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' 8  A failure to
heed these warnings will result in a mockery of the profession, a breakdown
of justice, and a complete loss of faith in American criminal proceedings.
II. SUPREME COURT HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Scope of This Article
Before reviewing the relevant Supreme Court precedent leading up to
Alabama v. Shelton, it must be noted that this article will not analyze other
equally important right to counsel issues such as when the right attaches,' 9
and then once it is earned, what is the "effective assistance of counsel, 20
"critical stages" of a trial for Sixth Amendment purposes (stages in which it
is crucial that counsel be present),2' use of uncounseled misdemeanors to
enhance sentences, 22 the right to counsel in collateral post-conviction
18. See discussion infra Part V.A.
19. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is triggered when an adversarial judicial proceeding has commenced, "whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment").
20. The Strickland Court identified the standard for effective assistance of counsel:
A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or
omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the
circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,690 (1984)
21. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975) ("Because of its limited function and its
nonadversary character, [a] probable cause determination is not a "critical stage" in the prosecution
that would require appointed counsel."); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding
that a photographic display, even if conducted post-indictment, is not a critical stage of the
proceedings and therefore does not require the presence of counsel); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (finding that a post-indictment lineup is a "critical stage" requiring the assistance of
counsel).
22. See Kirsten M. Nelson, Nichols v. United States and the Collateral use of Uncounseled
Misdemeanors in Sentence Enhancement, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 557, 574-81 (1996) (discussing the
Nichols decision, which held that a court could properly use a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to
enhance a subsequent sentence).
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proceedings,23 the appointment of counsel in quasi-criminal cases,24 the
appointment of counsel for juvenile defendants,25 and court appointed
counsel in landlord-tenant disputes.26 Rather, it will focus exclusively on the
first step of the Sixth Amendment process: the circumstances in which an
indigent defendant should be entitled to appointed counsel when charged
with a criminal offense. Setting aside for the moment any proposed
professional standard this counsel should be held to, or at what stages in the
process an appointed counsel should be dutifully standing by their client's
side, the inquiry will be limited to the question of how many indigent
criminal defendants can employ the constitutional right to have free legal
representation, and what type of charges must they face in order to take
advantage of this right.27
B. Historical Rationale for the Right to Appointed Counsel
While some commentators claimed to have discovered the roots of the
right to appointed counsel in Roman history,28 for purposes of this article the
modern right to counsel commences with English statutory and common law
before the colonization of America. 29  As always, in searching for the
historical underpinnings of an important legal concept, the legal historian
"must have his eyes on the end of the story, and be able to pick out the
23. See William D. Adams, Note, The Prosecutorial Appeal of Parole: The Indigent Prisoner's
Right to Counsel, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 177, 189-90 (1994) (discussing the Supreme Court's opinion
in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973), which found that the right to counsel at parole
hearings "must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the [parole
board]").
24. See Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Quasi-Criminal
Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397, 399-
400 (noting that "[clourts have used the due process clause to provide indigent litigants the right to
appointed counsel in defense of their liberty interests in such 'quasi-criminal' matters as juvenile
delinquency, civil commitment, civil contempt, termination of parental rights, divorce, paternity, and
deportation") (citations omitted).
25. See Patricia Puritz & Wendy Shang, Juvenile Indigent Defense: Crisis and Solutions, 15
CRIM. JUST. 22, 23 (2000) ("[Tlhe idea that juvenile court is an informally run 'kiddie court' with no
need for vigorous legal advocacy seems to rest comfortably beside the notion that juveniles should
receive harsher and more punitive sentencing--even the death penalty.").
26. See Anne Stark Gallagher, Civil Gideon? Poor Tenants Want N.Y. to Pay For Lawyers in
Evictions, 75 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 16, 16 (discussing a lawsuit which argued that the equal-
protection and due-process provisions of the New York and U.S. constitutions entitled low-income
tenants to counsel in eviction cases).
27. Moreover, the "right to counsel" as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and discussed in
this article should not be confused with the slightly different and non-constitutional "right to
counsel" derived from the Fifth Amendment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wayne
D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement
Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
181, 181 n.2 (1998).
28. See Thomas F. Liotti, Does Gideon Still Make a Difference?, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 105, 107
(1998) (citing John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 385
(1923) and David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735,
739-48 (1980)).
29. See generally Julius 1. Marke, How the Right to Counsel Developed, N.Y. L. J., March 16,
1999, at 5.
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beginnings of those principles and rules and institutions which have survived
and are operative today. 3 °
Much humor and criticism have accompanied the well known procedure
and settled rule at English common law by which a prisoner was not allowed
counsel in any capital offense or commission of a felony (except treason
after 1688), unless a point of law arose which properly required review, and
yet was permitted the use of such representation in petty trespasses and
minor misdemeanors.3' Modem American criminal jurisprudence has
considered this a perversion.32  Blackstone denounced the rule rhetorically:
"For upon what face of reason.., can that assistance be denied to save the
life of a man, which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty
trespass?,,
33
30. Id. (quoting the 17th Century lawyer John Selden).
31. See Marke, supra note 29, at 7. Marke relates the anecdotal "'Case of the Mad Peer,' which
took place in the House of Peers in Westminster Hall in 1760, and is subtitled 'The Right to Have a
Fool for a Client."' Id. Marke states that "it reflects how historic events gradually developed the
concept of the right to counsel as presently guaranteed by our law:"
Lawrence Shirely, fourth Earl Ferrers, despite his descent from a long line of noble
blood, was an "ill-looking" man, "dangerous" in appearance and corresponded to his
reputation of being a "horrid lunatic . . . wild beast, a mad assassin and a low wretch."
For all his noble titles, the Earl was obviously a homicidal maniac. Believing that the
steward of his estate was involved in a conspiracy against him with the Earl's wife, who
had received a separation from him by an Act of Parliament, he brutally and ferociously
battered and finally murdered him while in a state of intoxication. Being a peer of the
realm, Lord Ferrers was required by law to be tried by his peers in the House of Lords.
Although many peers were absent, at least 140 were present. The case for the Crown was
ably presented by the Attorney General, Charles Pratt, afterward Lord Camden, Chief
Justice of the Common Pleas and Lord Chancellor. When Lord Ferrers' time came to
present his defense, he pleaded for an adjournment till the next day "as there are some
circumstances that I could wish to consult my counsel about." After being directed to
proceed with his defense, the Earl then startled the House by claiming: "My Lords, I can
hardly express myself, the very circumstance shocks me so much, but I am informed,
from several circumstances of an indisposition of mind .... The defense I mean is
occasional insanity of mind and I am convinced from recollecting within myself, that, at
the time of this action, I could not know what I was about!"
Id.
32. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932):
An affirmation of the right to the aid of counsel in petty offenses, and its denial in the
case of crimes of the gravest character, where such aid is most needed, is so outrageous
and so obviously a perversion of all sense of proportion that the rule was constantly,
vigorously and sometimes passionately assailed by English statesmen and lawyers....
One of the grounds upon which Lord Coke defended the rule was that in felonies the
court itself was counsel for the prisoner. ... But how can a judge, whose functions are
purely judicial, effectively discharge the obligations of counsel for the accused? He can
and should see to it that in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt
with justly and fairly. He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or
participate in those necessary conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes
partake of the inviolable character of the confessional.
Id. at 60-6 1.
33. Id. at 60-61 (citation omitted).
This paradoxical procedure was not altered until a broader
understanding of the right to counsel "was ultimately accepted, especially in
the colonies, as a response to political exigencies." 34 It was not until 1836
that "Parliament passed a law granting all individuals accused of felonies
the right to have counsel in the presentation of their defense. 35 Some of this
legal reform was also attributed to Jeremy Bentham, and his fight "against
the inequities of the law.",
36
The English common law attitude disfavoring the assistance of counsel
was ultimately not to be imitated by the colonies. Initially, the colonies
adopted a distrust of lawyers in general, and the attorney became "a symbol
of oppression in both England and the colonies., 37  This distaste for the
profession is evident in the West New Jersey Charter of Fundamental Laws
of 1676, which freed litigants of the compulsion to hire counsel to defend
their cases. 38 The reform movement in England that favored the freedom to
enlist counsel, however, eventually took hold in the United States.39 Many
of the American colonies enacted the role of public prosecutor.4 0 Due to the
prosecutor's knowledge of the system, familiarity with the "idiosyncrasies of
juries," and relationship with "the personnel of the court," the assistance of
counsel "became essential to counter the prosecutor's advantage.
4 1
The right to counsel was enumerated in most state constitutions after the
colonies declared their independence. 2 The denial of this right formed part
34. Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 40 (1991).
35. Nelson, supra note 22, at 557-58; see also Garcia, supra note 34, at 40.
36. Marke, supra note 29, at 7.
37. Garcia, supra note 34, at 40.
38. Id.
39. Marke, supra note 29, at 8.
40. Garcia, supra note 34, at 41.
41. Id.
42. See id. The Court in Powell v. Alabama explained this development:
The rule [that prevailed at English common law] was rejected by the colonies. Before the
adoption of the federal Constitution, the Constitution of Maryland had declared "That, in
all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right.., to be allowed counsel." (Art. 19,
Constitution of 1776). The Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in 1780 (Part the
First, Art. XII), the Constitution of New Hampshire, adopted in 1784 (Part I, Art. XV),
the Constitution of New York of 1777 (Article XXXIV), and the Constitution of
Pennsylvania of 1776 (Art. IX), had also declared to the same effect. And in the case of
Pennsylvania, as early as 1701, the Penn Charter (Art. X) declared that "all Criminals
shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their Prosecutors;" and there
was also a provision in the Pennsylvania statute of May 31, 1718 (Dallas, Laws of
Pennsylvania, 1700-1781, Vol. 1, p. 134), that in capital cases learned counsel should
be assigned to the prisoners. In Delaware, the Constitution of 1776 (Art. XXV) adopted
the common law of England, but expressly excepted such parts as were repugnant to the
rights and privileges contained in the Declaration of Rights; and the Declaration of
Rights, which was adopted on September 11, 1776, provided (Art. XIV) "That in all
Prosecutions for criminal Offences, every Man hath a Right ... to be allowed
Counsel, .... " In addition, Penn's Charter, already referred to, was applicable in
Delaware. The original Constitution of New Jersey of 1776 (Art. XVI) contained a
provision like that of the Penn Charter, to the effect that all criminals should be admitted
to the same privileges of counsel as their prosecutors. The original Constitution of North
Carolina (1776) did not contain the guarantee, but c. 115, § 85, Sess. Laws, N. Car., 1777
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of the grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence, and opposition
to the Federal Constitution arose in part "because the procedural protections
accorded the accused in state constitutions, with the exception of the jury
trial, were conspicuously missing from the new document. '43  This
opposition subsided, of course, with the adoption of the Bill of Rights and
the Sixth Amendment, which demanded that the Constitution "[reflect] the
American public's insistence on 'the maintenance of a fair balance in
criminal trials, and to that end the protection of the rights of the accused.'"44
Part of the Sixth Amendment's recognition of a balance in criminal trials
was the natural rejection of the English rule denying counsel when faced
with a more serious offense. 45 The ubiquitous right to counsel of one's
choice and at one's expense, therefore, was enacted in large part to "redress
the imbalance of power that existed in English procedure" and was secured
with the interests of the defendant in mind.46
When the Sixth Amendment was introduced and later adopted on the
House and Senate floors during the First Congress, "hardly a protest was
heard and the debate on the right of an accused in all criminal prosecutions
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, was so limited and
uncontroversial, that problems later arose as to its actual meaning. '47 One of
these problems was the interpretation of the Amendment that included the
right to appointed counsel if a defendant could not afford one. This problem
was not solved until the United States Supreme Court decided the line of
cases that began with Powell v. Alabama."
(N. Car. Rev. Laws, 1715-1796, Vol. 1, 316), provided"... That every person accused
of any crime or misdemeanor whatsoever, shall be entitled to council in all matters which
may be necessary for his defence, as well to facts as to law;..." Similarly, in South
Carolina the original Constitution of 1776 did not contain the provision as to counsel, but
it was provided as early as 1731 (Act of August 20, 1731, § XLIII, Grimke, S. Car. Pub.
Laws, 1682-1790, p. 130) that every person charged with treason, murder, felony, or
other capital offense, should be admitted to make full defense by counsel learned in the
law. In Virginia there was no constitutional provision on the subject, but as early as
August, 1734 (c. VII, § III, Laws of Va., 8th Geo. II, Hening's Stat. at Large, Vol. 4, p.
404), there was an act declaring that in all trials for capital offenses the prisoner, upon his
petition to the court, should be allowed counsel. The original Constitution of Connecticut
(Art. 1, § 9) contained a provision that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to be heard by himself and by counsel;" but this constitution was not
adopted until 1818. However, it appears that the English common law rule had been
rejected in practice long prior to 1796. See Zephaniah Swift's "A System of the Laws of
the State of Connecticut,"'printed at Windham by John Byme, 1795-1796, Vol. II, Bk.
5, "Of Crimes and Punishments," c. XXIV, "Of Trials," pp. 398-399.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-63 (1932).
43. Garcia, supra note 34, at 41.
44. Id. (quoting F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 10, 27 (1951)).
45. Id. at 40-41.
46. Id.
47. Marke, supra note 29, at 8.
48. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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C. Powell v. Alabama
The Powell decision in 1932 stands as the prominent forefather to all
other Supreme Court decisions outlining the indigent criminal defendant's
right to counsel. 49  In Powell, a group of young African-American
defendants, later known as the "Scottsboro boys," were charged with the
rape of two white girls.5° Under Alabama statute, this crime was punishable
by death.5' The record was disturbingly vague, but it was certain that the
trial court had not appointed counsel to the young defendants until the very
morning of trial, at which point a lawyer was largely meaningless.52 The
defendants "were not asked whether they had, or were able to employ,
counsel, or wished to have counsel appointed; or whether they had friends or
relatives who might assist in that regard if communicated with. 5 3 After
three separate trials, each lasting only one day, all of the defendants were
convicted and sentenced to death.54
The Court in Powell, instead of focusing on the guarantees in the Sixth
Amendment, ruled that the trials in Scottsboro, Alabama were fundamentally
unfair under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55
Carefully limiting its holding to the facts of the case, the Court stated:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law.56
Instead of imposing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel upon the states, it
found the right to have the assistance of appointed counsel in such a setting a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. 7 If the right to counsel
would serve as a fundamental necessity for a wealthy defendant in this
49. See Nelson, supra note 22, at 559 ("It was not until 1932, in the landmark case of Powell v.
Alabama, that the right to counsel began to evolve into a significant constitutional doctrine.") (citing
Laurie S. Fulton, Note, The Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1599, 1605 (1989)).
50. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49.
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 56. The Court extrapolated on the useless nature of this "counsel" that might have been
appointed to the defendants:
Prior to [the morning of trial], the trial judge had appointed all the members of the
bar"for the limited purpose of arraigning the defendants. Whether they would represent
the defendants thereafter if no counsel appeared in their behalf, was a matter of
speculation only, or, as the judge indicated, of mere anticipation on the part of the court.
Such a designation, even if made for all purposes, would, in our opinion, have fallen far
short of meeting, in any proper sense, a requirement for the appointment of counsel.
Id.
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id. at 50.
55. Id. at 71.
56. Id. at 71.
57. Id. at 67-68; see also Catz & Firak, supra note 24, at 401.
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circumstance, then certainly the same protection must apply to the poor
African-American defendants in Alabama.
The Court, speaking through Justice Sutherland, utilized powerful
language in the Powell opinion.58 Most important was the recognition that
"[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."5 9 The underlying rationale
was that the Constitution requires a fair trial, and a fair trial requires a
lawyer on both sides of the adversarial process, regardless of the defendant's
ability to pay for one.6 ° Sentencing an uncounseled defendant to death, the
Court surmised, would amount to "judicial murder.",6 1
Despite this extension of the Due Process Clause, "the invocation of a
long list of circumstances demanding the defendants' representation ended
up restricting the scope of the Court's 'right to counsel.' 62  Even after the
Powell decision, therefore, the states were still free to deny an indigent
defendant the right to counsel in any non-capital felony case as long as the
proceeding did not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness so prevalent in
the Scottsboro trials. 63
58. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69. An oft-quoted phrase bears repeating:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it




61. Id. at 72.
62. Victoria Nourse, Gideon's Muted Trumpet, 58 MD. L. REV. 1417, 1422 (1999).
63. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71-73. Despite this limitation on the Court's holding, Justice
Butler's dissenting opinion still expressed regret at the court's extension of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
If correct, the ruling that the failure of the trial court to give petitioners time and
opportunity to secure counsel was denial of due process is enough, and with this the
opinion should end. But the Court goes on to declare that "the failure of the trial court to
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 76 (Butler, J., dissenting).
619
D. Johnson v. Zerbst64
Six years later in Zerbst, the Court ruled that Powell should have a more
definitive reach in federal courts.65 The defendant in Zerbst was convicted
in federal court of "possessing and uttering" counterfeit money without the
assistance of counsel.66 He filed a petition for habeas corpus that eventually
reached the Supreme Court.67 The Court overturned his conviction, this time
basing its decision on the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel "in all
criminal prosecutions. 68 Justice Black, writing for the majority, thought
that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, the Sixth Amendment
"withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty" unless he was
represented by counsel at trial.69
The Court's reasoning in Zerbst relied on the forceful language and
apparently just conclusion of Powell, but it reached that same conclusion
through a different vehicle.7° The Court emphasized Powell's notion that an
indigent and uncounseled defendant suffers a marked disadvantage against
the government, and could therefore suffer a denial of due process, but their
holding ultimately rested on Sixth Amendment grounds. 71 The opinion also
viewed the right to counsel "as a constitutionally defined element of a
criminal trial," and it was therefore "the trial court's affirmative obligation
to see that the accused was given this right., 72 The Court invoked the
"obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional
legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to
take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced
and learned counsel. 73
The Court in Zerbst ultimately found relief for federal indigent
defendants by way of the Sixth Amendment instead of the Due Process
Clause.74  However, by merely interpreting the Sixth Amendment's
mandates on the federal government, Zerbst left Powell's demands on the
states undisturbed.75 States were still only required to offer court appointed
counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases or in particular situations
where an uncounseled trial would offend all notions of due process.
76
64. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
65. Id. at 463.
66. Id. at 459.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 463 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 462-63.
71. See id.
72. Liotti, supra note 28, at 119 (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467-68).
73. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462-63.
74. Id. at 467-69.
75. See Liotti, supra note 28, at 119.
76. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467-69.
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E. Betts v. Brady
77
The Court refused to extend either Fourteenth Amendment or Sixth
Amendment protection to indigent defendants in state courts four years later
in a 1942 decision that has been labeled "counterintuitive. 78  In Betts, the
defendant was charged with robbery, demanded appointed counsel, and was
refused.7 9 He was subsequently convicted, and the Supreme Court upheld
that conviction by holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause did not mandate counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a
felony offense in state court.8 ° Just as they had done in Powell, the Court
focused on the specific facts of the case: the defendant was forty-three, he
was familiar with the criminal process, and he was "of ordinary
intelligence.' In this setting, however, these specific factual findings led
the Court to believe that the defendant had the ability to defend himself
adequately, and he was therefore not denied any constitutional protection.82
In addition, the Court explicitly refused to incorporate the fundamental
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as applied to federal indigent defendants
in Johnson, into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements on
the states.83 The Court troubled itself with a review of every state
constitution in order to find the will of the people in appointing indigent
defendants counsel at the expense of the state.84 Their conclusion was firm:
77. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
78. Garcia, supra note 34, at 47.
79. Betts, 316 U.S. at 456-57.
80. Id. at 472-73.
81. Id. at 472.
82. Id. at 472-73.
83. Id. at 464-66. The Court stated:
In the light of this common law practice, it is evident that the constitutional provisions to
the effect that a defendant should be "allowed" counsel or should have a right "to be
heard by himself and his counsel," or that he might be heard by "either or both," at his
election, were intended to do away with the rules which denied representation, in whole
or in part, by counsel in criminal prosecutions, but were not aimed to compel the State to
provide counsel for a defendant.
Id.
84. Betts, 316 U.S. at 467-68 nn.21-22:
The constitutions of all the States, presently in force, save that of Virginia, contain
provisions with respect to the assistance of counsel in criminal trials. Those of nine
States may be said to embody a guarantee textually the same as that of the Sixth
Amendment or of like import. In the fundamental law of most States, however, the
language used indicates only that a defendant is not to be denied the privilege of
representation by counsel of his choice. Georgi (Art. I, Par. V); Iowa (Art. I, § 10);
Louisiana (Art. I, § 9); Michigan (Dec. of Rights, Art. H, § 19); Minnesota (Art. I, § 6);
New Jersey (Art. I, § 8); North Carolina (Art. I, § 11); Rhode Island (Art. I, § 10); West
Virginia (Art. III, § 14). Some assert the right of a defendant "to appear and defend in
person and by counsel." Arizona (Art. II, § 24); Colorado (Art. II, § 16); Illinois (Art. fl,
§ 9); Missouri (Art. II, § 22); Montana (Art. III, § 16); New Mexico (Art. II, § 14); South
Dakota (Art. VI, § 7); Utah (Art. I, § 12); Wyoming (Art. I, § 10). Others phrase the right
as that "to be heard by himself and (his) counsel": Arkansas (Art. II, § 10); Delaware
This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of the States,
it has been the considered judgment of the people, their
representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary, the
matter has generally been deemed one of legislative policy. In the
light of this evidence, we are unable to say that the concept of due
process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the
States, whatever may be their own views, to furnish counsel in
every such case.
In dissent, Justice Black found the Court's ruling contrary to its prior
holdings in Powell and Johnson.86 He reiterated the logic underlying those
decisions and concluded that depriving a defendant of counsel because of his
indigent status is at odds with "common and fundamental ideas of fairness
and right., 87  He expressed the view that the Sixth Amendment should be
applicable to the states, but even if it is not, the Court should have rested its
decision on narrower grounds, namely that the petitioner was denied due
process under the Federal Constitution.88 Nevertheless, the majority found
that the "denial of [appointed] counsel in Betts was not so offensive to
[this] ... fundamental ... fairness as to constitute a violation of due
process."89
Justice Black espoused disdain for the Court's decision for two
additional reasons. The first was practical: "[a] practice cannot be
reconciled with 'common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right,'
which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of conviction merely
because of their poverty.' 90 The second was statistical: unlike the majority,
Justice Black had a different interpretation of the states' statutes and
provisions allowing for a right to appointed counsel. 9' Although the states
(Art. 1, § 7); Indiana (Art. 1, § 13); Kentucky (Bill of Rights, § I1); Pennsylvania (Art. I,
§ 9); Tennessee (Art. I, § 9); Vermont (Ch. I, Art. 10th); or "by himself and by counsel":
Connecticut (Art. I, § 9) or "by himself, and counsel": New Hampshire (Bill of Rights,
15th); Oklahoma (Art. I, § 20); Oregon (Art. 1, § I1); Wisconsin (Art. I, § 7); or "by
himself and counsel or either": Alabama (Art. I, § 6); "by himself or counsel or (by)
both": Florida (Dec. of Rights, § I1); Mississippi (Art. III, § 26); South Carolina (Art. 1,
§ 18); Texas (Art. I, § 10). The verbiage sometimes employed is: "to appear and defend
in person and with counsel": California (Art. I, § 13); Idaho, (Art. I, § 13); North Dakota
(Art. 1, § 13); Ohio (Art. I, § 10); or "in person, or by counsel"; Kansas (Bill of Rights,
§ 10); Nebraska (Art. I, § 11); Washington (Art. 1, § 22). Nevada (Art. I, § 8) and New
York (Art. 1, § 6) add: "as in civil actions." Some constitutions formulate the right as one
"to be heard by himself and his counsel at his election" or "himself and his counsel or
either at his election": Massachusetts (Part I, § 12), Maine (Art. 1, § 6). Maryland (Dec.
of Rights, Art. 2 1) states the right as that "to be allowed counsel."
85. Id. at 47 1.
86. Id. at 475-76 (Black, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Black, J., dissenting) ("Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in
which, as here, denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude ... that the defendant's case
was adequately presented.").
88. Id. at 474-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 472; see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 561.
90. Betts, 316 U.S. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 477 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting).
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may not have perceived the right to counsel as a fundamental right, he
pointed out that "[i]n thirty-five states, there is some clear legal requirement
or an established practice that indigent defendants in serious non-capital as
well as capital criminal cases ... be provided with counsel on request.
92
Despite Justice Black's reservations, Betts went to jail without the assistance
of counsel, 93 and it required the loud burst of a trumpet call twenty-one years
later to revive his spirit.
F. Gideon v. Wainwright 94
The societal import of the 1963 Gideon decision is nearly impossible to
overstate. "Few decisions have evoked as much popular support."
95
Clarence Earl Gideon was convicted in Florida of "having broken and
entered a pool [hall] with the intent to commit a misdemeanor," which was
a felony under Florida law.96 Gideon was denied the right to appointed
counsel by the trial court, and the Court ultimately found that this was in
contravention of the Sixth Amendment.97 They explicitly overruled the
Betts decision, and solidified what they had been hinting at for decades: the
right to be heard by counsel was essential to a fair trial.98
Justice Black, now joined by a majority of justices, demonstrated that
even at the time Betts was decided, the Court "had ample precedent for
acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are
fundamental safeguards of liberty ... are equally protected against state
invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 9 In
fact, "the Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt break with its own well-
considered precedents."'to Justice Black also made known that "[t]wenty-
two States, as friends of the Court, argue that Betts was 'an anachronism
when handed down' and that it should now be overruled."10'
The Court's legal legwork took little effort and few pages to describe.0 2
They first determined that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is fundamental and essential to a fair trial. 0 3 Consequently, and like
92. Id.
93. Id. at 457.
94. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
95. See Garcia, supra note 34, at 49.
96. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336-37.
97. Id. at 343-44.
98. Id. at 344.
99. Id. at 341.
100. Id. at 344.
101. Id. at 345.
102. Id. at 343-44.
103. Id. ("Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.").
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other fundamental rights essential to a fair trial, this right was incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law and
binding on the states.' °4 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applied to those indigent defendants charged with crimes in state courts. 10 5
This would ensure equal protection to indigent defendants, and instill the
maxim in our system that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries."' 106 In order to fairly and justly counter the states' "vast sums of
money [establishing] machinery to try defendants accused of crime," the
indigent defendant was at least entitled to show up in court with an advocate
by his side.' °7 The Court noted that American constitutions, both federal and
state, have always placed great emphasis on "procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals."'' 0 8 This
noble ideal could not be realized "if the poor man charged with crime has to
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him."' °9
To what degree the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the states was
the focus of the discussion of the concurring opinions in Gideon."0 Gideon
had been convicted of a felony, and so the immediate impact of the majority
decision was to require states to supply counsel to poor defendants who were
at least accused of a felony."' This holding differed from the Zerbst
decision, which interpreted the Sixth Amendment's applicability solely in
federal courts and held that a lawyer must be appointed in any case in which
"life or liberty" was at stake. 1 2 Justice Douglas was of the view that the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights, made applicable to the states by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment, were not "watered-down" versions of those
guarantees." 3  This philosophy holds that the states should be forced to
provide counsel to all defendants whose life or liberty is at stake, as the
federal courts had been required to do since Johnson.14 Justice Clark made
a similar argument and said that there should be no distinction between
104. The Court explained:
We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption based as it was on our prior cases, that a provision
of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is made
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts
was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is
not one of these fundamental rights.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.





110. See id. at 345-47 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 347-49 (Clark, J., concurring): id. at 349-52
(Harlan, J., concurring).
11I. Id. at 336-37.
112. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467-68.
113. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 346-47 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting confidently that the contrary
view has not prevailed in the Court's history).
114. See id.; Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467 ("The Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged
with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential
jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.").
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capital and noncapital cases." 5  He felt that the Fourteenth Amendment
required due process of law "for the deprival of 'liberty' just as for the
deprival of 'life,' and there cannot constitutionally be a difference in the
quality of the process based merely upon a supposed difference in the
sanction involved."'"16  Because the decision applied to at least some
noncapital cases, namely any offense that qualified as a felony under the
states' penal codes, the majority decision fulfilled only some of his
expectations. 117
Justice Harlan took a somewhat different stance. He suggested that
Betts be accorded "a more respectful burial.""' 8 Instead of incorporating the
Sixth Amendment in its entirety, he reasoned, the Court's prior precedent
did not justify carrying over "an entire body of federal law and [applying] it
in full sweep to the States.""19 He parenthetically hinted that the issue of
whether the rule requiring appointed counsel to indigent defendants should
extend to all criminal cases "need not now be decided."'
20
Justice Harlan's doubts about the pervasiveness of the right to counsel,
and the Court's decision, which was, of course, limited to the facts of the
case, left open the question of how far the Sixth Amendment, as made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, would extend.
121
It was clear that after Gideon, any indigent defendant charged with a felony
was entitled to court appointed counsel. 22 What about those charged with
misdemeanors? Nine years later, the Court would provide an inventive
answer.
G. Argersinger v. Hamlin
23
Jon Argersinger was charged in Florida with carrying a concealed
weapon, a crime punishable by imprisonment of up to six months, a $1,000
fine, or both. 2 4 He was tried before a judge without the benefit of counsel
and sentenced to 90 days in jail. 125  He brought a habeas corpus action,
alleging that he was unable as an indigent person to effectively raise and
115. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 348 (Clark, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 349 (Clark, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 336-37 (noting the offense in Gideon was a felony under Florida law).
118. Id. at 349 (Harlan, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 339, 345.
123. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
124. ld. at 26.
125. Id.
present to the trial court a viable defense to the charge for which he was
convicted. 1
26
The Court, in reflecting on whether or not to extend the right to court
appointed counsel to misdemeanor cases, looked to historical understandings
of a complimentary Sixth Amendment right: the right to a trial by jury. 1
27
The state argued that since the right to a jury trial had only been mandatory
for those crimes punishable by more than sixth months in prison, the same
rule should apply to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 128  The Court
disagreed, reiterating what it had said in Powell and Gideon, that "[t]he
assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair
trial."' 29 Moreover, the Court recalled that in England, the right to counsel
was inexplicably denied in the most heinous crimes, but provided for more
petty offenses. 30  It was clear that by inserting in the Bill of Rights a
guarantee that an accused be entitled to counsel "in all criminal
prosecutions," our nation's founders meant to do away with this awkward
procedure in felony prosecutions.13' However, this certainly did not mean
that they also intended to "embody a retraction of the right in petty offenses
wherein the common law previously did require that counsel be
provided."132
The Court then spouted its numerous reasons for extending the right to
counsel to some misdemeanors. 3 3 First, even though Powell and Gideon
involved felonies, "their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where
an accused is deprived of his liberty."'134 Second, it was ignorant to suppose
that the legal and constitutional questions involved in a misdemeanor case
"are any less complex" than those in felony prosecutions.' Third, the
existence of guilty pleas, just as prevalent in misdemeanor cases as in felony
prosecutions, called for the guiding hand of counsel so that "the accused
may know precisely what he is doing.' 36  Finally, the sheer volume of
misdemeanor cases, far more in number than felonies, created "an obsession
for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result."' 137  This
126. Id.
127. Id. at 29 ("The right to trial by jury, also guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment... was
limited by Duncan v. Louisiana .... But ... the right to trial by jury has a different genealogy.").
128. Id. at 30 ("While there is historical support for limiting the 'deep commitment' to trial by
jury to 'serious criminal cases,' there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to
assistance of counsel.").
129. Id. at 31 ("We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by
imprisonment for less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a
lawyer.").
130. Id. at 30 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60, 64-65 (1932)); see also discussion
infra Part V.A.
131. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30.
132. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 32-37.
134. Id. at 32.
135. Id. at 33; see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 563 ("The Court reasoned that the complexities
and implications associated with misdemeanor convictions often equally require effective counsel.").
136. Argersinger, 704 U.S. at 34.
137. Id. at 34. The Court quoted statistics in the 1960's and 1970's involving felony and
626
[Vol. 31: 609, 2004] Alabama v. Shelton
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
reality weighed heavily in favor of granting appointed counsel to those
charged with misdemeanors. 1
3 8
The final holding of Argersinger requires the most attention to detail.
The Court explicitly stated that they need not consider the requirements of
the Sixth Amendment in regard to the right to counsel "where loss of liberty
is not involved."' 139 Presumably, this loss of liberty referred only to actual
time served in jail. This limited the holding to only some misdemeanors,
namely those where the prosecutors know they are seeking a sentence of
imprisonment:
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial .... Under the rule we announce today, every
judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it,
unless the accused is represented by counsel.
140
With this waive of its judicial hand, the Court generously extended the
right to counsel to any case in which the accused was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. 141 Two questions remained. The first was a forward-looking
critique: Why not extend the right to appointed counsel to all misdemeanors
or all criminal charges where there is a possibility of imprisonment or
another bright line rule? The second was a backward-looking concern: The
states have already had difficulties funding the expanded right to counsel, so
how are they going to fund this new explosion of court appointed lawyers?
Chief Justice Burger discussed the first inquiry in his concurrence.
42
While agreeing that the Court was headed in the proper direction, he voiced
concern that their rule might be difficult to apply in court. 14 3 He implied that
the burden placed on the trial judge in making "a predictive evaluation of
each case" to determine whether a jail sentence will be imposed would place
"a new load on courts already overburdened and already compelled to deal
with far more cases in one day than is reasonable and proper."' 44 He was
misdemeanor cases and cited numerous commentators who have painted a bleak picture of a
misdemeanor conviction. id. at 34-35. "The misdemeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and
frequently irresponsible preparation on the part of the defense, the prosecution, and the court.
Everything is rush, rush." Id. at 35-36 (quoting William E. Hellerstein, The Importance of the
Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 THE LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 151, 152 (1970)).
138. Argersinger, 704 U.S. at 36-37.
139. Id. at 37.
140. Id. at 37, 40.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 41-42 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
143. Id. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
144. Id.
more inclined to draw the line at penalties in excess of six months
imprisonment. 145  After these concerns surfaced, however, Chief Justice
Burger expressed his full fledged confidence in the ability of the system to
meet its new demands.146  "The holding of the Court today may well add
large new burdens on a profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics of
the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it.'
147
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan gave a brief answer to the second
remaining question: How can the states manage to provide counsel to any
indigent defendant they wish to send to prison? 148  He proposed that law
students as well as private practicing attorneys might provide an important
source of legal representation for the indigent. 149
Justice Powell was not so optimistic. After expressing his disapproval
of the line drawn by the court, 50 he went on to assert his position that the
right to counsel should only be required in petty cases "whenever the
assistance of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial."'15' Although he
concurred in the result, he displayed some distaste with the Court's rigid
application of the Sixth Amendment guarantee and mentioned that "[s]ome
petty offense cases are complex; others are exceedingly simple.' 5 2  The
result would be that in some cases, "the costs of assistance of counsel may
exceed the benefits."'5 3 He predicted a "seriously adverse impact upon the
day-to-day functioning of the criminal justice system," consisting of "delay
and congestion" in the courts and inadequate resources to provide counsel to
every indigent defendant that fell within the majority's protected group. 54
Justice Powell thought a further problem with the majority rule was its
insensitivity to deprivations of property as well as liberty. 55  He listed
145. Id. at 41 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
146. Id. at 44 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 563-64.
147. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 44 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Nelson, supra note 22, at
563-64.
148. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
149. Id. Justice Brennan surveyed programs that had already explored the option of using law
students in the country's accredited law schools in clinical programs in which faculty supervised
students aid clients in a variety of civil and criminal matters. Id. He cited statistics from The
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) which showed that more than
125 of the country's 147 accredited law schools had established clinical programs in which faculty
supervised students aided clients. Id. "These programs supplement practice rules enacted in 38
States authorizing students to practice law under prescribed conditions. Like the American Bar
Association's Model Student Practice Rule (1969), most of these regulations permit students to make
supervised court appearances as defense counsel in criminal cases." Id. at 40-41; see also CLEPR,
STATE RULES PERMITTING THE STUDENT PRACTICE OF LAW: COMPARISONS AND COMMENTS 13
(1971).
150. Justice Powell envisioned a more lenient standard in which the right to counsel was judged
on a case by case analysis based on judicial discretion. See Nelson, supra note 22, at 564. More
specifically, he wanted the line to be drawn so that "an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in
all cases in which there is a due process right to a jury trial." Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 45-46
(Powell, J., concurring).
151. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 47 (Powell, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 49 (Powell, J., concurring).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 52, 59 (Powell, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 51-52 (Powell, J., concurring).
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several consequences more damaging than a brief period of incarceration,
and reminded the Court that these restrictions might be suffered by an
indigent who was uncounseled at trial. 156 This seemed to be an unfair result:
the more sensible solution in his mind was the adjudication of the indigent's
need for counsel on a case by case basis, keeping under consideration the
complexity of the offense, the probable sentence that would follow, and the
individual factors peculiar to each case. 5 7 The majority ultimately did not
heed Justice Powell's advice, and the Court drew the line for an indigent's
right to appointed counsel at "actual imprisonment."'' 58 This standard was to
be challenged seven years later in Scott v. Illinois.1
59
H. Scott v. Illinois' 6°
Aubrey Scott was convicted of shoplifting in Illinois, and the maximum
penalty for such an offense [was] a $500 fine or one year in jail, or both. 161
He was only fined for the conviction. 62 He appealed his conviction all the
way to the United States Supreme Court, and he based his appeal on one
premise: the logical culmination of the line of cases leading up to
Argersinger required that counsel be appointed to all indigents whenever
imprisonment is an authorized penalty. 63 The Court found no merit in his
plea.' 64 Just as Betts had halted the constitutional progression of Powell and
Johnson, so too did Scott put an end to the blossoming right to counsel
favored by the Gideon and Argersinger decisions.
65
The Court's language in a plurality decision consisted mostly of
practical considerations:
[Our numerous opinions in precedent cases suggest] that
constitutional line drawing becomes more difficult as the reach of
the Constitution is extended further, and as efforts are made to
156. Id. Justice Powell surmised:
The logic [the Court] advances for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which the
penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies equally well to cases in which other
penalties may be imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "non-jail" penalties are
more serious than brief jail sentences.
Id. at 52; see also Garcia, supra note 34, at 53 ("It is anomalous, [Justice Powell] argued, to deny
counsel in some circumstances wherein the penalty, though not involving prison, is harsher than
brief imprisonment.").
157. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 40.
159. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
160. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
161. Id. at 368.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 368-70.
164. Id. at 369.
165. Id. at 369-74.
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transpose lines from one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to
another.... Although the intentions of the Argersinger Court are
not unmistakably clear from its opinion, we conclude today that
Argersinger did indeed delimit the constitutional right to appointed
counsel in state criminal proceedings. Even were the matter res
nova, we believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that
actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the
mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants
adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the
constitutional right to appointment of counsel.t
66
Aside from insisting that the line drawn in Argersinger was the most
reasonable, the plurality showed a certain amount of hesitancy to extend the
right to counsel given the costs to the states. 67  They assumed that "any
extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily
substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States. 1
68
Their simple rationale did not rest well with all of the justices, and the
Court was heavily divided. 169  Justice Powell, whose concurrence gave
stronger authority to the four member plurality, reaffirmed his position that a
more flexible rule was needed to be consistent with due process and to
"better serve the cause of justice."' 7 ° Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, found it appropriate to memorialize the text of the
Sixth Amendment once again, and found that "the plain wording of the Sixth
Amendment and the Court's precedents compel the conclusion that Scott's
uncounseled conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and
should be reversed."'' Justice Brennan's dissent quoted Powell, Johnson,
166. Id. at 372-73. The Court would further detail this standard in Glover v. United States, 531
U.S. 198, 203 (2001) (recognizing that "any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment
significance"); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996) (ruling that the "right [to appointed
counsel] does not extend to nonfelony trials if no term of imprisonment is actually imposed"); and
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981) (refusing to extend the right of appointed
counsel to include "prosecutions which, though criminal, do not result in the defendant's loss of
personal liberty").
167. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
168. Id. The Court supported this conclusion with the acknowledgement that the line in
Argersinger was drawn "with full awareness of the various options." Id. at 373 n.4. The author of
this article must humbly suggest that "full awareness" in hindsight seldom turns out to be precisely
that.
169. See id. at 374-90.
170. Id. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell delineated:
Despite my continuing reservations about the Argersinger rule, it was approved by the
Court in the 1972 opinion and four Justices have reaffirmed it today. It is important that
this Court provide clear guidance to the hundreds of courts across the country that
confront this problem daily. Accordingly, and mindful of stare decisis, I join the opinion
of the Court. I do so, however, with the hope that in due time a majority will recognize
that a more flexible rule is consistent with due process and will better serve the cause of
justice.
Id. at 374-75.
171. Id. at 376 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and Gideon, and came to the conclusion that those decisions demanded the
extension of the right to counsel to a defendant such as Scott. 172
Justice Brennan refuted the plurality's vision of budgetary disaster
among the states in three ways. 73  First, those fears were, as the Court
admitted, speculative. 74 Second, he proffered that "public defender systems
have proved economically feasible, and the establishment of such systems to
replace appointment of private attorneys can keep costs at acceptable levels
even when the number of cases requiring appointment of counsel increases
dramatically."1 75  The third, and in Justice Brennan's view the strongest
argument in refutation of the plurality's anticipated financial stress on the
states, was the empirical evidence in the states' penal codes, which showed
that a majority of states, at the time of the decision, had implemented an
"authorized imprisonment" standard for the right to counsel without
detrimental results. 76 In fact, Scott would be entitled to appointed counsel
under the current systems of at least thirty-three states at the time of the
Court's decision.1 77 This meant that the plurality's "alarmist prophesy" that
an authorized imprisonment standard would "wreak havoc on the states" was
unfounded.178  Finally, Justice Brennan accused the Court of turning
Argersinger "on its head."'179  This was because its opinion restricted the
right to counsel, "perhaps the most fundamental Sixth Amendment right,
more narrowly than the admittedly less fundamental right to jury trial."' 8 °
172. Id. at 376-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 384-89.
174. Id. at 384-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A]lthough more persons are charged with
misdemeanors punishable by incarceration then are charged with felonies, a smaller percentage of
persons charged with misdemeanors qualify as indigent, and misdemeanor cases as a rule require far
less attorney time.") Id. at 384-85.
175. Id. at 385 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he public defender system alternative also answers
the argument that an 'authorized imprisonment' standard would clog the courts with inexperienced
appointed counsel.").
176. Id. at 386-88 nn.18-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing all of the states' penal codes and
where they draw the line for the right to appointed counsel).
177. These statistics were piled on top of the plurality's own admission that the empirical work
done in order to discover the effect of Argersinger on the states had shown "that the requirements of
Argersinger have not proved to be unduly burdensome." Id. at 373 n.5.
178. Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 n.5. Professor Garcia expanded on this idea:
Furthermore, it is ironic that Scott's practical implications would pose more serious
systemic problems than the alternative "authorized imprisonment" standard it rejected.
As Justice Powell pointed out in Argersinger, and Justice Brennan reiterated in his Scott
dissent, the "actual imprisonment" test presents numerous administrative difficulties,
which include: timeconsuming decisions before trial of the likely sentence, inaccurate
predictions, discretionary abuse, "unequal treatment," and "apparent and actual" bias.
Garcia, supra note 34, at 55.
179. Scott, 440 U.S. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (citing Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 46 (1972)).
Justice Blackmun's short dissent proposed that the line be drawn at any
offense which is punishable by more than six months' imprisonment
(correlating with the right to a jury trial), or in any case where the defendant
is convicted and actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment.'81
The decision in Scott cloaked the stage with new scenery. It prepared
the Court for the coming of an even more rigorous analysis under the Sixth
Amendment: what constitutes "actual imprisonment?"
III. ALABAMA V. SHELTON'82
A. Factual History
The Court's fragmented opinions in Argersinger and Scott anticipated
the coming of a case that would draw the line for the right to counsel even
more particularly. In Scott, the Court had narrowly confined "loss of
liberty" to mean only "actual imprisonment."' 183 The question now to be
presented before the court was the precise definition of "actual
imprisonment." That question was answered in June of 2002.184
LeReed Shelton was charged with third-degree assault, an offense which
carried the maximum punishment of one year imprisonment and a $2,000
fine.185  He represented himself at a bench trial and was convicted.
18 6
Shelton then invoked his right to a new trial by a jury and represented
himself at that trial as well. 187 The court repeatedly warned Shelton about
the dangers of self-representation, but it did not offer him assistance of
counsel at the state's expense. 88  He was convicted again, and was
sentenced to thirty days in the county prison. 89 ... [T]he court suspended
[this jail] sentence and placed Shelton on probation for two years,' ...
conditioned on his payment of court costs, a $500 fine, reparations of $25,
and restitution in the amount of $516.69. " 190
B. Procedural History
Shelton appealed his conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds, but the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.' 9' The state court of appeals
"initially held that an indigent defendant who receives a suspended prison
sentence has a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel and remanded
181. Scott, 440 U.S. at 390 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
183. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74.
184. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).






191. Id. at 658-59.
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for a determination whether Shelton had 'made a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of his right.' 192  "When the case returned on remand,
however, the appeals court reversed course: A suspended sentence does not
trigger the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel unless there is
'evidence in the record that the [defendant] has actually been deprived of
liberty.""193  The court held that Shelton had not been denied any Sixth
Amendment right at trial because he remained on probation.
94
Shelton appealed from this change of heart, and the Supreme Court of
Alabama reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals in relevant part. 195 The
Alabama Supreme Court, referring to the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Argersinger and Scott, held that a defendant may not be
"sentenced to a term of imprisonment" without representation.' 96  The
Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that "a suspended sentence constitutes a
'term of imprisonment' within the meaning of Argersinger and Scott even
though incarceration is not immediate or inevitable."'' 97 Furthermore, since
the state was constitutionally barred from activating the conditional
sentence, the Alabama court concluded that "'the threat itself is hollow and
should be considered a nullity."" 198 Therefore, "the court affirmed Shelton's
conviction and the monetary portion of his punishment, but invalidated that
aspect of his sentence imposing 30 days of suspended jail time."' 99
The State of Alabama appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and
the Court granted certiorari because lower courts were divided on the
question of whether "appointment of counsel is a constitutional prerequisite
to imposition of a conditional or suspended prison sentence.
200
Three different positions on the issue had been presented to the Court.
Shelton argued "that an indigent defendant may not receive a suspended
sentence unless he is offered or waives the assistance of state appointed
counsel. 20' Alabama now conceded that the Sixth Amendment barred
activation of a suspended sentence for a conviction without representation,
192. Id. at 659.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Exparte Shelton, No. 1990031, 2000 WL 1603806, at *5 (Ala. May 19, 2000).
196. Id. at *4.
197. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 659.
198. Exparte Shelton, 2000 WL 1603806, at *4.
199. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 659-60.
200. Id. at 660. The Court cited three decisions that found the imposition of a suspended sentence
upon an uncounseled defendant unconstitutional and three decisions that found otherwise. id. The
three cases cited by the Court that equated "actual imprisonment" with a suspended sentence were:
United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Foster, 904 F.2d 20, 21
(9th Cir. 1990); and United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1976). Id. The three
cases rejecting that proposition were: Griswold v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 789, 791 (Va. 1996);
State v. Hansen, 903 P.2d 194, 197 (Mont. 1995); and Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269, 274 (5th
Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 895 (1973). Id.
201. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 660.
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but it did "not prohibit imposition of such a sentence as a method of
effectuating probationary punishment., 20 2  A third position, argued by
amicus curiae, stated that the Sixth Amendment "does not bar the imposition
of a suspended or probationary sentence upon conviction of a misdemeanor,




Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion.2 4  In responding to
these positions, the majority first reviewed the holdings of Gideon,
Argersinger, and Scott.20 5 They found that "[s]ubsequent decisions have
reiterated the Argersinger-Scott "actual imprisonment" standard. 20 6 The
Court then rejected the amicus position and stated the following:
A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of
conviction. [Therefore], once the prison term is triggered, the
defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the
underlying offense. The uncounseled conviction at that point
result[s] in imprisonment.2 °7
The amicus argument rested on two grounds.20 8  First, sequential
proceedings must be analyzed separately for Sixth Amendment purposes,
and only those proceedings "result[ing] in immediate actual imprisonment"
require state-appointed counsel.209 This reasoning was borrowed from two
prior cases before the Court.210 Nichols v. United States held it proper to use
an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a sentence in a
subsequent felony offense. 21 ' Gagnon v. Scarpelli denied an indigent
defendant the right to appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing.2t 2
The Court disagreed with the amicus argument:
Gagnon and Nichols do not stand for the broad proposition amicus
would extract from them. The dispositive factor in those cases was
202. Id. at 661.
203. Id. The Court assigned this task to Charles Fried, a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court.
Id. at 661 n.4.
204. Id. at 657.
205. ld. at 661.
206. Id. at 662. The Court cited Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001) (conceding that
-any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance"') as well as Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (holding the "constitutional line is 'between criminal proceedings that
resulted in imprisonment, and those that did not'). Id.
207. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 663 (quoting the amicus brief) (emphasis in original).
210. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973).
211. 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994).
212. 411 U.S. 778, 791 (1973).
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not whether incarceration occurred immediately or only after some
delay. Rather, the critical point was that the defendant had a
recognized right to counsel when adjudicated guilty of the felony
offense for which he was imprisoned .... Unlike this case, in
which revocation of probation would trigger a prison term imposed
for a misdemeanor of which Shelton was found guilty without the
aid of counsel, the sentences imposed in Nichols and Gagnon were
for felony convictions.2 3
The Court, therefore, rejected the notion that Nichols or Gagnon
"altered or diminished Argersinger's command that 'no person may be
imprisoned for any offense unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial.' 21 4  The Sixth Amendment is implicated at "the stage of the
proceedings ... where ... guilt is adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment
established, and prison sentence determined."2 5 For Shelton, this was at the
circuit court trial where he was found guilty without the aid of counsel.
16
The second prong of the amicus argument was that the practical
considerations weighed against the extension of the Sixth Amendment's
right to appointed counsel to a defendant in Shelton's situation. 21 7 Amicus
cited figures in its brief which suggested that "'hundreds of thousands' of
uncounseled defendants receive suspended sentences, but only 'thousands'
of that [group] are incarcerated upon violating ... their probation. 21 8 These
statistics made it difficult to imagine requiring each one of those defendants
to be represented at the state's expense.2 ' 9 Also, "probation is 'now a critical
tool of law enforcement"', and requiring state appointed counsel in these
situations would "unduly hamper the States' attempts to impose effective
probationary punishment. ' 220 The Amicus brief proposed a solution in which
a state could "impos[e] a suspended sentence on an uncounseled defendant
and require appointment of counsel, if at all, only at the probation revocation
hearing, when incarceration is imminent.,
221
The Court stated that the importance of probationary punishment did not
warrant "the reduction of the Sixth Amendment's domain that would result
from the regime amicus hypothesizes. 222  Furthermore, the Court was
213. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 664.
214. Id. (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
215. Id at 664-666.
216. Id. at 658.
217. ld. at 665.
218. Id.





concerned with the nature of such probation revocation proceedings.22 3 It
highlighted that in Alabama:
The proceeding is an "informal" one ... at which ... the court [is
under] no obligation to observe customary rules of evidence ....
[In addition to its informal nature,] the sole issue at the hearing...
is whether the defendant breached the terms of probation .... and
the validity or reliability of the underlying conviction is beyond
attack."'
This means that the defendant would still be denied the guiding hand of
counsel when it is needed most.2 25 Ultimately, the Court found that the
assistance of counsel at probation revocation hearings did not sufficiently
cure the ill of having been convicted and sentenced to a term in prison
without the aid of counsel.226
In response to the dissent's proposal, which would allow imposition of a
suspended sentence on an uncounseled defendant but not activation of that
sentence, the Court declared:
Severing the analysis in this manner makes little sense. One cannot
assess the constitutionality of imposing a suspended sentence while
simultaneously walling off the procedures that will precede its
activation .... The dissent [offered a number] of safeguards that
Alabama might provide at the probation revocation stage sufficient
to cure its failure to appoint counsel prior to sentencing .... [but the
Court countered that] ... there is no cause for speculation about
Alabama's procedures; they are established by Alabama statute and
decisional law.., and they bear no resemblance to those the dissent
invents in its effort to sanction the prospect of Shelton's
imprisonment on an uncounseled conviction . . . . [I]n light of
Alabama's actual circumstances, we do not comprehend...
Alabama['s]... probation revocation [procedures]... bring[ing]
Shelton's sentence within constitutional bounds.227
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See generally id. at 666-67.
226. Id. The court stated:
We think it plain that a hearing so timed and structured cannot compensate for the
absence of trial counsel, for it does not even address the key Sixth Amendment inquiry:
whether the adjudication of guilt corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently
reliable to permit incarceration. Deprived of counsel when tried, convicted, and
sentenced, and unable to challenge the original judgment at a subsequent probation
revocation hearing, a defendant in Shelton's circumstances faces incarceration on a
conviction that has never been subjected to "the crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing."
Id. at 667 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
227. Id. at 667-68.
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In response to predictions that requiring appointed counsel in situations
similar to Shelton's would impose devastating financial burdens on the
states, the Court pointed to the current statutory mandates of the states:
All but 16 States... would provide counsel to a defendant in
Shelton's circumstances, either because he received a substantial
fine or because state law authorized incarceration for the charged
offense or provided for a maximum prison term of one year ....
There is thus scant reason to believe that a rule conditioning
imposition of a suspended sentence on provision of appointed
counsel would affect existing practice in the large majority of
States.228
Even if some states could not bear the costs of appointing counsel to
defendants in Shelton's position, the Court continued, they had the option of
employing "pretrial probation," which was already in use in at least twenty-
three states.229 "Under [this system], the prosecutor and defendant agree to
defendant's participation in a pretrial rehabilitation program .... The
adjudication of guilt and imposition of a sentence for the underlying offense
228. Id. at 669-70. The Court listed these state laws:
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-5.2 (1985); State v. Hermanns, 278 N.J. Super. 19, 29,
650 A.2d 360, 366 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(1) (1999); VT. STAT. ANN.,
TIT. 13, § 5201 (1998); Alexander v. Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 913 (Alaska 1971)
(interpreting Alaska CONST., Art. I, § 11, to provide counsel when punishment may
involve incarceration); Tracy v. Municipal Court for Glendale Judicial Dist., 22 Cal.3d
760, 766, 150 Cal. Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227, 230 (1978) (CAL.PENAL CODE ANN. § 686
(West 1985) affords counsel to misdemeanor defendants); DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 29, §
4602 (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2602 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 802-1 (1999); ILL.
COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 113-3 (1992); Brunson v. State, 182 Ind. App. 146, 149, 394
N.E.2d 229, 231 (1979) (right to counsel in misdemeanor proceedings guaranteed by Ind.
Const., Art. I, § 13); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.100(4)(b), 31.110(1) (1999); LA.
CONST., Art. I, § 13; MASS. RULE CRIM. PROC. 8 (2001); MINN. RULE CRIM. PROC.
5.02(1) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3902 (1995): N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
170.10(3)(c) (1993); OKLA. STAT., Tit. 22, § 1355.6.A (Supp. 2002); ORE. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 135.050(4) (Supp. 1998); TENN. SUP. CT. RULE 13(d)(1) (2001); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 26.04(b)(3) (Supp.2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-159, 19.2-160
(2000); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. RULE 3.1(a) (2002); W. VA. CODE § 50-4-3 (2000);
WIS. STAT. § 967.06 (1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-102 (2001); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-
851 (d)(2), § 19-852(a)(1) (1997); IOWA RULE CRIM. PROC. 26 (2002); Wright v. Denato,
178 N.W.2d 339, 341-342 (Iowa 1970); MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 27A, §§ 2(h)(2), 4(b)(2)
(1997 and Supp.2000); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.397, 193.120 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 604-A:2(I), 625:9(IV)(a)(I) (Supp.2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-16-2(D), §
31-16-3(A) (2000); OHIO RULES CRIM. PROC. 2(C), 44(A) (2002); PA. RULE CRIM. PROC.
122(A) (2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(c)(2) (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-40-
6, 23-40-6.1, 22-6-2(1) (1998); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-296(a) (Supp.2001)
(imposition of a "suspended sentence of incarceration with a period of probation"
necessitates appointment of counsel).
Id. at 1773-74 nn.7-9.
229. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 671.
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then occur only if and when the defendant breaches those conditions. 23 °
Like the amicus proposal, pretrial probation reserves the appointed counsel
requirement to the small number of cases in which jail time proves
necessary.23' Contrary to the amicus' position, however, "pretrial probation
also respects the constitutional imperative" set out in Argersinger.
232
Alabama, which maintained that there was no constitutional bar to
imposing a suspended sentence, invited the court to regard the two years
probation as a separate and independent sentence that the state could enforce
as it would be a judgment or a fine.233 The state argued that a freestanding
probation sentence "could be enforced as a criminal fine or restitution order
could, in a contempt proceeding. '234 Furthermore, the contempt proceeding
would include the assistance of counsel. 235 The Court did not even consider
this position because there was no indication that the probation sentence was
indeed separable from the suspended prison term.236
The Alabama Attorney General had been forced to acknowledge "at oral
argument that he did not know of any State that imposes, post
conviction.... a term of probation unattached to a suspended sentence. 237
Even in their opening brief, Alabama admitted that, "by reversing Shelton's
suspended sentence, the [Supreme Court of Alabama] correspondingly
vacated the two-year probationary term. 238 Therefore, the Court concluded
that Alabama has developed its position "late in [the] litigation and before
the wrong forum.,
2 39
Finally, the majority opinion specifically affirmed the Alabama
Supreme Court's ruling that "'[a] defendant who receives a suspended or
probated sentence to imprisonment has a constitutional right to counsel.'
240
230. Id. "Because this device is conditioned on the defendant's consent, it does not raise the
question whether imposition of probation alone so restrains a defendant's liberty as to require
provision of appointed counsel." Id. at 671, n. 11.
231. ld.at671-71.
232. Id. at 672. The Court went on to state:
There is thus only one significant difference between pretrial probation and
the 'sensible option' urged by the dissent .... [that] pretrial probation is
substantially less expensive. It permits incarceration after a single trial,
whereas the dissent's regime requires two--one (without counsel) to place the
defendant on probation, and a second (with counsel) to trigger imprisonment.
Id. at 672 n.12.
233. Id. at 672.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 672-73.
236. Id. at 673.
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 6).
239. Id. at 674. It was "[nlot until its Reply Brief [that] the State [held this position and realized]
that Shelton's suspended sentence will be activated if he violates the terms of his probation." Id. at
673 n.13.
240. Id. at 674. (quoting Exparte Shelton, No. 1990031, 2000 WL 1603806, at *5 (Ala. May 19,
2000)). The Court further stated:
Satisfied that Shelton is entitled to appointed counsel at the critical stage when his
guilt or innocence of the charged crime is decided and his vulnerability to
imprisonment is determined, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of
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The Court essentially ruled that a suspended sentence constituted "actual
imprisonment" under Argersinger, even though the defendant might never
spend a day in prison.24'
D. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, led by Justice Scalia, began its opinion with a different
outlook on the direction that the Sixth Amendment was heading. The
dissent stated that the Court had "repeatedly emphasized actual
imprisonment as the touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel. 242
They also made clear that, at least in their minds, the majority position was
an aberration: "Today's decision ignores this long and consistent
jurisprudence, extending the misdemeanor right to counsel to cases bearing
the mere threat of imprisonment. '243  Their attack on the majority position
began with a list of contingencies:
The Court holds that the suspended sentence violates respondent's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it "may 'end up in the
actual deprivation of [respondent's] liberty,"' . . . if he someday
violates the terms of probation, if a court determines that the
violation merits revocation of probation... and if the court
determines that no other punishment will "adequately protect the
community from further criminal activity" or "avoid depreciating
the seriousness of the violation." 24
If all these contingencies occurred, the dissent continued, "the Alabama
Supreme Court would mechanically apply its decisional law applicable to
routine probation revocation ... rather than adopt special procedures for
situations that raise constitutional questions. 245
Alabama.
Id. This holding was based on the obvious conclusion, stated in Respondent's Brief, that:
A probationer who is revoked and incarcerated suffers actual imprisonment. If an
uncounseled misdemeanant can be sentenced to a suspended sentence and
probation, and then revoked and incarcerated, the result is no different from that of
an uncounseled misdemeanant who is convicted and immediately incarcerated.
Both suffer actual imprisonment from an uncounseled conviction.
Respondent's Opening Brief at 2, Shelton, (No. 00-1214).
241. See Shelton, 535 U.S at 673-74.
242. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 675 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas.
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1932); ALA. CODE § 15-22-54(d)(1), (4)
(1995)).
245. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
639
According to Justice Scalia, the question of how an Alabama probation
revocation proceeding after an uncounseled conviction might rise to a Sixth
Amendment challenge should not have been discussed.246 Rather, the only
question was whether "imposition of a suspended or conditional sentence in
a misdemeanor case invokes a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." 247 The dissent offered an answer that mimicked the logic of the
state of Alabama's argument:
Since imposition of a suspended sentence does not deprive a
defendant of his personal liberty, the answer to that question is
plainly no. In the future, if and when the State of Alabama seeks to
imprison respondent on the previously suspended sentence, we can
ask whether the procedural safeguards attending the imposition of
that sentence comply with the Constitution. But that question is not
before us now.248
The dissent essentially saw the majority decision as an advisory opinion, and
it chastised the Court for venturing into the mind of the Alabama state
courts.249 However, the dissent could not resist the opportunity to respond to
the Court's speculation of how Alabama might deny counsel to indigent
misdemeanants and still impose suspended sentences.2 50  "Surely the
procedures attending reimposition of a suspended sentence would be
adequate if they required, upon the defendant's request, complete retrial of
the misdemeanor violation with assistance of counsel. By what right does
the Court deprive the State of that option? ' 251 In a footnote, the dissent
criticizes the majority's recommendation of pretrial probation simply
because it forces the state to implement one "functional equivalent" rather
than the other.2 52 If pretrial probation was so effective, the dissent chided,
"we would expect to see pretrial probation used for both major and minor
crimes and to see it used in place of, not in addition to, post-trial
probation. '253 After expressing its disappointment with the majority's
246. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the question of Alabama's procedures in
probation revocation proceedings "is not the one before us, and the Court has no business offering an
advisory opinion on its answer").
247. Id.
248. Id. (emphasis in original).
249. See id.
250. See id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. Id. The dissent provided its reasoning for allowing the states to utilize this option:
It may well be a sensible option, since most defendants will be induced to comply with
the terms of their probation by the mere threat of a retrial that could send them to jail, and
since the expense of those rare, counseled retrials may be much less than the expense of
providing counsel initially in all misdemeanor cases that bear a possible sentence of
imprisonment. And it may well be that, in some cases, even procedures short of complete
retrial will suffice.
Id. at 677-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 677 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. Id.
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refusal to entertain different options available to Alabama, they returned to
the catchall Sixth Amendment repudiation: "the practical consequences of
expanding the right to appointed counsel., 254  Although the majority had
predicted that thirty-four states would have already provided appointed
counsel to a defendant in Shelton's position, the dissent shed some more
light on this abstract number. 2"5 They found this statistic to be "irrelevant"
because the Court's holding was "not confined to defendants like
respondent.,256  Under the Court's ruling, "appointed counsel must
henceforth be offered before any defendant can be awarded a suspended
sentence, no matter how short. ' 257  Ten of the thirty-four States mentioned
by the majority only offered counsel in cases where the suspended sentence
either exceeded three months, was likely to be imposed, or "when the court
knows that the punishment it will assess includes imprisonment., 258 All ten
254. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our prior opinions placed considerable weight on the
practical consequences of expanding the right to appointed counsel beyond cases of actual
imprisonment.").
255. See id. at 679.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 681 n.4. This footnote reads in full:
Ten of the thirty-four States cited by the Court do not offer appointed counsel in all cases
where a misdemeanor defendant might suffer a suspended sentence. Six States guarantee
counsel only when the authorized penalty is at least three or six months' imprisonment.
See Idaho Code §§ 19-851(d)(2), 19-852(a) (1948-1997); State v. Hardman, 120 Idaho
667, 669-670, 818 P.2d 782, 784-785 (App.1991); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27A, §§ 2(h)(2),
4(b)(2) (1957-1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 178.397, 193.120 (1996); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-
16-2, 31-16-3 (2000); State v. Woodruff, 124 N.M. 388, 396, n. 3, 951 P.2d 605, 613, n. 3
(1997); Ohio Rules Crim. Proc. 2(C), 44(A) (2002); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 106(c) (1998);
Pa. Rules Crim. Proc. 122(A), (B) (2002); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 510 Pa. 106, 111,
n. 7, 507 A.2d 57, 59, n. 7 (1986). South Dakota does not provide counsel where the
maximum permissible sentence is 30 days' imprisonment, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-2
(1998), if "the court has concluded that [the defendant] will not be deprived of his liberty
if he is convicted," §§ 23A-40-6, 23A-40-6.1. Texas's statute declares that appointed
counsel should be offered to any defendant "charged with a misdemeanor punishable by
confinement," Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 26.04(b)(3) (Vernon Supp.2002), but the
state courts have construed this provision to require appointment only "when the court
knows that the punishment it will assess includes imprisonment or when the trial is before
the jury and the possible punishment includes imprisonment." Fortner v. State, 764
S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tex.App. 1989) (emphasis added). Thus, nothing in Texas law assures
counsel in a misdemeanor bench trial resulting in a suspended sentence. Finally, in two
of the States that appoint counsel when imprisonment is "likely" to be imposed, the
courts have not yet decided whether the likelihood of a suspended sentence qualifies, but
the answer-as has been held with respect to the similarly phrased Michigan and
Pennsylvania statutes cited supra-is probably no. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:158A-5.2
(1985); Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216, 223 (1971); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7A-451(a)(1) (1999); State v. McCoy, 304 N.C. 363, 370, 283 S.E.2d 788, 791-
792 (1981).
The District of Columbia must also be numbered among the jurisdictions whose law is
altered by today's decision. D.C. Code Ann. § 11-2602 (2001) guarantees counsel in "all
cases where a person faces a loss of liberty and the Constitution or any other law requires
the appointment of counsel." (Emphasis added.) Today's decision, discarding the rule of
of these statutory schemes allowed for the possibility of a defendant like
Shelton to be convicted at an uncounseled trial.259 This actually meant that a
majority of states would now have to be burdened with a change in their
procedures.26°
The dissent was not prepared to impose this burden which included not
only "the cost of providing state-paid counsel in cases of such insignificance
that even financially prosperous defendants sometimes forgo the expense of
hired counsel; but also the cost of enabling courts and prosecutors to respond
to the 'over-lawyering' of minor cases. '26' They also expressed sympathy
for the minority of states who would have appointed counsel to a defendant
in Shelton's position, but who, because of the court's ruling, must "keep
their current disposition forever in place, however imprudent experience
proves it to be. 262 While the majority had suggested that the burdens were
small because the circumstances in which any of these states denied
appointed counsel to misdemeanants were quite narrow, the dissent reasoned
that "the narrowness of the range of circumstances covered says nothing
about the number of suspended-sentence cases covered., 263 Even though the
range of cases may be small, the number of cases in which a suspended
sentence is imposed might well be vast "precisely because of the minor
nature of the offense. ' 26
4
Justice Scalia finished his short dissent with a brief conclusion:
"Today's imposition upon the States finds justification neither in the text of
Argersinger, brings suspended sentences within this prescription. The Court asserts that
the burden of today's decision on these jurisdictions is small because the "circumstances
in which [they] currently allow prosecution of misdemeanors without appointed counsel
are quite narrow." Ante, at 1774, n. 10 (emphasis added). But the narrowness of the
range of circumstances covered says nothing about the number of suspended-sentence
cases covered. Misdemeanors punishable by less than six months' imprisonment may be
a narrow category, but it may well include the vast majority of cases in which (precisely
because of the minor nature of the offense) a suspended sentence is imposed. There is
simply nothing to support the Court's belief that few offenders are prosecuted for crimes
in which counsel is not already provided. The Court minimizes the burden on
Pennsylvania by observing that the "summary offenses" for which it permits uncounseled
suspended sentences include such rarely prosecuted crimes as failing to return a library
book within 30 days and fishing on Sunday. Ante, at 1774, n. 10. But they also include
first-offense minor retail theft, driving with a suspended license, and harassment (which
includes minor assault). See Thomas, supra, at 109, 507 A.2d, at 58; 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
1543(b)(1) (Supp.2002); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2709(a), (c)(1) (2000). Over against the
Court's uninformed intuition, there is an amicus brief filed by States that include 2 of the
10 with exceptions that the Court calls "narrow," affirming that the rule the Court has
adopted today will impose "significant burdens on States." Brief for Texas, Ohio,
Montana, Nebraska, Delaware, Louisiana, and Virginia as Amici Curiae 22.
Id. at 681 n4.
259. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 679 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. See supra note 258.
261. Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 679 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264. Id.
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the Constitution, nor in the settled practices of our people, nor in the prior
jurisprudence of this Court. I respectfully dissent. '265
IV. THE EFFECT AND IMPACT OF THE SHELTON DECISION
Shelton's war had been waged, and Shelton himself, assuming the role
of the indigent defendant who might lose his liberty, had been victorious.
266
In a smaller sense, the decision deciding his fate had been a confident step
forward for those committed to constitutional safeguards for indigent
criminal defendants.267 In a larger sense, Shelton was simply an irresolute
but sufficient response to a very particular question: Did "actual
imprisonment" include a suspended sentence that may never result in actual
jail time?2 68 The Court had responded in the affirmative. 269 Few cases have
arisen that actively put Shelton into action, 270 but one particular decision has
shed some light on the question of a freestanding probation sentence.'
In United States v. Perez-Macias, the defendant was convicted of a
misdemeanor in 2002 for illegal entry into the United States. 272  He was
arrested less than two weeks later and convicted again for illegal entry into
the United States, as well as "two counts of transporting illegal aliens" into
the country. 273 He was not represented by counsel for the first misdemeanor
conviction, and he received a stand-alone sentence of probation. 4 When he
265. Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




270. One decision provided a straight forward application of Shelton. See Barnes v. State, 570
S.E.2d 277, 278 (Ga. 2002). The defendant had been sentenced to a suspended term in prison, and
the trial court failed to discern whether he had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel. Id. at 278. Another case seems to apply Shelton retroactively to a delinquency proceeding
and holds that if "proceedings to revoke [the defendant's] probation ever be initiated, Shelton
provides that punishment resulting in the loss of liberty cannot be imposed because [the defendant]
was not provided counsel at the delinquency hearing." C.M. v. State, 2002 WL 31151366 at *2
(Sept. 27, 2002, Ala. Crim. App.). A third discusses a sentence that was enhanced because of a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that resulted in a suspended sentence. United States v. Black,
37 Fed. Appx. 654, (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The court vacated the sentence, and held that prior
uncounseled suspended sentences, invalid under Shelton, are also invalid for any other reason. Id.
Another case cites the holding in Shelton but denies an indigent defendant the right to appointed
counsel in a civil contempt proceeding. Krieger v. Virginia., 567 S.E.2d 557, 564 n.7 (2002). The
Supreme Court has had to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand one particular case to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in light of the ruling in Shelton. Torres-Soria v. United States.
537 U.S. 1041 (2002) (mem.); see also United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 69 Fed. Appx. 832 (9th
Cir. 2003) (mem.) (holding a conviction predicated upon a prior uncounseled removal proceeding
does not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
271. United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2003).
272. Id. at 422-23.
273. Id. at 423.
274. Id.
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was sentenced for the second offense, the United States argued that he
should receive an enhanced sentence under the sentencing guidelines
because of this previous conviction.275 The defendant claimed that they
could not use the first uncounseled misdemeanor because under Shelton an
indigent defendant was entitled to appointed counsel even for a free-standing
probation sentence.276 The Fifth Circuit distinguished the Shelton case and
drew even more detailed lines around the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.277 The court first considered the decision in Shelton:
Shelton did not address the sentence of probation at issue in this
case because a suspended sentence is not the same as a stand-alone
sentence of probation. The sentence under consideration in Shelton
was a suspended sentence coupled with probation, while in this
case, [the defendant] received probation without a suspended
sentence .... [11n the federal system, probation is available as a
stand-alone sentence and suspended sentences are not used.278
The court then specifically distinguished a suspended jail sentence from
a stand-alone probation sentence:
If a defendant receives only a sentence of probation, he is sentenced
to community release with conditions; he does not receive a
sentence of imprisonment .... [Furthermore,] [i]f a defendant
serving a stand-alone probation sentence violates a condition of
probation, his probation may be revoked after a hearing and he may
be sentenced to any punishment that was originally available at
sentencing.1
79
Even though this hearing would "not retry issues of guilt or innocence,"
would not employ a standard of reasonable doubt, and would not use the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the court found that this difference warranted
using an uncounseled misdemeanor probation sentence to enhance a
subsequent crime.2 80 The court noted that "[tihe Shelton Court expressly
refused to address whether its holding applies to a sentence of probation
uncoupled with a suspended sentence., 2 8' Analyzing the matter de novo, the
Fifth Circuit did "not believe that the logic of Shelton compels extension of
the right to counsel to cases where the defendant receives a sentence of
probation uncoupled with a suspended sentence. 282  They thought the
Supreme Court jurisprudence focused exclusively on whether the defendant
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 426-27.
278. Id. at 426.
279. Id. at 426-27.
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received a sentence of imprisonment.283 Because the defendant in this case
was not sentenced to imprisonment for his uncounseled misdemeanor, his
conviction could be used to enhance a subsequent sentence.2" However, the
court conceded that it was possible that "a misdemeanor defendant who was
convicted without counsel may not be sentenced to prison upon revocation
of his probation." '285 Because the defendant before the court never went to
prison for his first offense, they did not address that particular issue.286 This
was one of the first cases attempting to answer one of the questions that
Shelton left open.287
Other questions still linger. Was physical imprisonment the only "loss
of liberty" that demanded an opportunity for appointed counsel under the
Sixth Amendment? Could the states ever implement some type of post
conviction probation revocation proceeding that would fulfill Sixth
Amendment requirements? The decision seemed to reject this
proposition, 288 but the question nonetheless remains. Would states begin to
impose freestanding probation sentences, upheld only by court contempt
proceedings or other civil penalties?
289
Finally, how exactly would the states be affected by this ruling? At the
time of this article, twenty-three states have made a change in their legal
schemes to reflect the ruling in Shelton. These changes have come by way
of actual legislative revisions to the statute, additions to annotated case notes
in a statute, or additions to the annotations in state constitutions.2 90 The
283. Id.
284. Id. at 428.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 429. Interestingly, another indigent defendant tried to appeal his conviction on the
same grounds before the Fifth Circuit two months later. See United States v. Martinez-Carrillo,
2003 WL 21997488 (Aug. 20, 2003, 5th Cir.). The defendant argued that his prior uncounseled
stand-alone probation sentences were invalid for any purpose. id. at *1. He acknowledged that his
"argument is foreclosed by [Perez-Macias]. ... [but] [h]e raise[d] the argument only to preserve it
for possible further review." Id.
287. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d at 426.
288. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 667. "We think it plain that a hearing so timed and structured cannot
compensate for the absence of trial counsel, for it does not even address the key Sixth Amendment
inquiry: whether the adjudication of guilt corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable
to permit incarceration.").
289. For an affirmative answer, see Leading Cases, L Constitutional Law, C. Criminal Law and
Procedure, 4. Sixth Amendment, 116 HARV. L. REV. 200, 259 (2002) ("Because Shelton does not
preclude the imposition of a probation-only sentence in the absence of counsel, states can tailor their
penalty schemes to avoid appointing counsel for every defendant who faces probation."). This
supposition, however, seems highly unlikely considering the Shelton Court's lack of faith in any
probation revocation proceeding that would meet constitutional safeguards. See Shelton, 535
U.S. at 667.
290. See ALA. CODE § 15-22-50 (2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901 (West Supp. 2002); CAL.
CONST. art. I § 15 (West Supp. 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-297 (West Supp. 2003); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-110 (2002); 2002 FLORIDA COURT ORDER 28 (C.O. 28) (amending FL. ST. RCRP
3.111) IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-6 (Michie 2002); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 10 (West 2002); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.210 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 513 (West
retroactive application of Shelton will be determined by the states or by the
Supreme Court in an appropriate subsequent case pursuant to their
jurisprudence regarding retroactivity. 291 This jurisprudence is based largely
on whether the Court would consider this to be a "new rule," and at what
procedural stage a defendant seeking retroactive relief has advanced. 92
If one takes the Shelton dissent statistics at face value, the majority of
states will have to change their criminal procedure systems so as to appoint
counsel to every uncounseled misdemeanant who receives a suspended
sentence. 93 Unfortunately, the nationwide empirical data is much too young
and far from adequate in painting a coherent picture of the effects of the
ruling. However, one must put some faith in Chief Justice Burger's
concurrence in Argersinger which intimated that "the dynamics of the
[legal] profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it."' 294 One
should also consider the majority opinion in Scott, which had to admit that
Argersinger had proved "reasonably workable. 295
V. DID SHELTON EXTEND THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL FAR
ENOUGH?
Despite Shelton's progression in favor of an expanded right to appointed
counsel, one must look deep into the history of the right to counsel to decide
whether the opinion has given full respect to the guarantees outlined in the
Sixth Amendment. The line of cases starting with Powell and culminating in
Shelton must be analyzed in a broader sense to determine if the legal
distinctions and constitutional standards propounded in those cases have
2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15, § 810 (West 2003); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (West 2002);
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-32-9 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 604-A 1-10 (2003); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. art. I, § 23
(2002); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10 (Anderson 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991b (West 2002);
PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-310 (2002); TEX. CONST. art I, § 10
(Vernon 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-306 (Michie 2002).
291. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
292. See id. at 300-11. ("It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a
new rule, and we do not attempt to define the spectrum of what or may not constitute a new rule for
retroactivity purposes.").
293. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674-81 (2002). (Scalia, J., dissenting) (showing that the
"Court's decision imposes a large, new burden on a majority of the States, including some of the
poorest").
294. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
295. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). Surprisingly enough, there have already been a
few positive responses to Shelton ruling, even from the Alabama State Bar Association itself. See
Jenny B. Davis, Staying Upbeat in an Uphill Battle, I No. 47 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 7 (2002). Davis
quoted a public defender in McAllen, Texas, who was glad the Supreme Court decided as it did in
Shelton. Id. The public defender said that "[iut's a daunting task, but it's the right thing to do ....
Everyone in the court system has to strive to do the right thing and treat each client fairly." Id. See
also Joseph P. Van Heest, Rights of Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases After Alabama v.
Shelton, 63 ALA. LAW. 370, 373 (2002) (pointing out that even though the "lawyers who represent
indigent defendants in criminal cases throughout Alabama do so at a great discount from what they
would otherwise receive as either retained criminal defense lawyers or even as an hourly rate in most
civil defense matters ... the persons they represent are without question entitled to effective
assistance of counsel").
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accorded full weight to the guarantee envisioned by America's constitutional
authors. In order to gain a more accurate perspective of what the right to
counsel and appointed counsel has meant in American history, the
vocabulary and exclamations in those decisions must be revisited.
A. Powell's and Gideon's Holdings
Early interpretations of the Sixth Amendment showed that "[tihere
[was] considerable doubt that [it], as originally drafted by the Framers of the
Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the fight of an accused
in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his
defense.296 This view of the Sixth Amendment was proposed in the first
case addressing the scope of the right to counsel. 97 It is also true, however,
that in subsequent cases the Supreme Court elicited a broader interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment.
The Powell Court, in making a due process determination, quoted
extensively from the state constitutions written after the colonies gained
independence as well as court precedents leading up to the 1930s.2 9' It
concluded that "a consideration of the nature of the right and a review of the
expressions of this and other courts, makes it clear that the right to the aid of
counsel is of [a] fundamental character."2 99  The question specifically
answered by the Court was whether the fight to counsel, and by extension,
the fight to appointed counsel, was among rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights that are of such a fundamental nature that they are binding upon the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 300 While limiting their holding to
the facts of the case, they nevertheless found that "the necessity of counsel
was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an
effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.,
30
'
The Gideon decision emphasized this idea once again.30 2 The Court
there labeled Powell's "conclusions about the fundamental nature of the
right to counsel [as] unmistakable. '30 3 The Gideon Court did not waver in
296. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) (citing W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURT 27-30 (1955)).
297. See United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) (holding that "[t]here is... no
general obligation on the part of the government.., to... retain counsel for defendants"); see also
Laurie S. Fulton, Note, The Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1599, 1604-05 (1989).
298. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 61-62 (1932).
299. Id. at 68.
300. Id. at 67.
301. Id. at 71.
302. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
303. Id. at 343. This language was repeated in 1936, four years after the Powell decision, in
Grosjean v. American Press Co.: "We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded...
647
its holding, and it explicitly stated that "reason and reflection require us to
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him."3° 4  Again, the Court made haste in
steadfastly declaring that "[t]he right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours.
The overriding theme and simple equation is difficult to miss: not
having representative counsel equals an unfair trial.3 °6 It is this new and
expansive constitutional rendering of the right to counsel that must become
the backdrop for any further inquiries into the scope of the Sixth
Amendment. The decisions in Powell and Gideon became the dominating
precedent with which the Court molded a new constitutional structure: a new
jurisprudence which views the right to appointed counsel as fundamental to
a fair trial and necessary to ensure a reliable outcome. Unfortunately, the
Court has decided not to continue traveling on this straight and narrow path.
B. Where Did Powell and Gideon Go Wrong?
The failure to adhere to the language in Powell and Gideon has
manifested itself in three ways. First, the Court failed to incorporate the full
range of Sixth Amendment protection into the Fourteenth Amendment's
mandate on the states in the Gideon decision.30 7 Second, after Gideon, the
Court began to focus not on the unreliability or fundamental unfairness of an
uncounseled trial, but instead on the type of sanction imposed to determine
whether appointed counsel was necessary.30 8 Finally, the Court has
misinterpreted and misapplied the Argersinger and Scott decisions which
speak to any "loss of liberty" as constitutionally forbidden without
representative counsel by one's side.3°
Addressing the first digression from the clear holdings in Powell and
Gideon, Justice Douglas' concurrence in Gideon examined the history of the
incorporation doctrine of the Bill of Rights and found that "rights protected
against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the Bill of Rights
against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of
counsel in a criminal prosecution." 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936).
304. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
305. Id.
306. See B. Mitchell Simpson, III, A Fair Trial: Are Indigents Charged With Misdemeanors
Entitled to Court Appointed Counsel?, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 417, 423 (2000).
307. It was only Justice Douglas' concurrence that had assumed the Sixth Amendment would be
applied in full to the states. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). The majority, however, narrowed its holding to the facts, which had the impact of
providing counsel to indigents only charged with felonies. Id. at 341-45.
308. Simpson, supra note 306, at 422-23.
309. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972); Scott v, Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370
(1979).
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guarantees. 31 ° Presumably, this meant that the Johnson v. Zerbst standard
for the right to counsel in federal courts (that appointed counsel is
constitutionally required in any case where the sentence deprives the
defendant "of his life or his liberty,")31' should have immediately been
applied to the states. This standard was not adopted, which meant that
subsequent to Gideon only those indigents charged with felonies were
entitled to court appointed counsel.312 Given the Court's language in
Gideon, and despite concerns about decisions which probe into questions not
presented, there was scant reason to limit "the fundamental nature of the
right to counsel" to felony trials.313
Secondly, after Gideon, the Court abandoned its vocabulary that had
pinpointed the right to counsel as a "fundamental right" and instead chose to
make this "fundamental right" dependent upon the type of sanction that was
imposed at trial.31 4 In a decision following Gideon, the justices found "that
the absence of counsel at trial 'infects the integrity of the truth determining
process,' and thus undermines the reliability of a conviction., 315 Of course,
the same reliability concerns are present in every criminal trial, regardless of
the sentence imposed, and regardless of whether it is a felony, misdemeanor,
or petty crime.3 16 In Powell, the Court said that the right to counsel "is of
such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
310. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 347 (Douglas, J., concurring).
311. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
312. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-45. This limitation is even more surprising when one considers the
plain language of Argersinger nine years later: "Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But
their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an accused is deprived of his liberty."
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972) (emphasis added).
313. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343. The anomalous nature of the Court's holding becomes even more
apparent when flanked by its own words at the end of the decision:
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth.
Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
314. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. This holding is seemingly inexplicable given the language only
a few pages earlier: "The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond its common-
law dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, or in the
decisions of this Court, to indicate that it was intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty
offenses." Id. at 30.
315. Paul D. Leake, Limits to the Collateral Use of Invalid Prior Convictions to Enhance
Punishment for a Subsequent Offense: Extending Burgett v. Texas and United States v. Tucker, 19
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123, 150 (1987) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 72 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
316. See Michael J. Stacchini, Nichols v. United States: Narrowing the Sixth Amendment
Guarantee to Counsel, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1233, 1245-46 (1995) ("Misdemeanor cases are often highly
complex and fraught with constitutional issues. Due to the high volume of misdemeanor cases,
many courts obsess over procuring speedy dispositions, giving inadequate attention to individual
defendants.").
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civil and political institutions."'317  The Supreme Court "focused on the
conduct of the hearing in making its determination of due process and not on
the sentence. 318 A peculiar shift in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence came
when Argersinger held that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial. 3 19  One commentator exposed the
Court's legal misstep:
Tying Argersinger's right to counsel to his sentence was not
necessary to reverse his conviction. The Supreme Court could
simply have said, in effect, that a fair trial, even for a misdemeanor,
requires the assistance of counsel, unless there is an intelligent and
knowing waiver. This holding has blurred the clear purpose of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel: to insure a fair trial for the
accused, regardless of the nature of the offense charged and its
penalty. Instead, and unfortunately, the Supreme Court focused on
the result of the trial and the sentence imposed.320
The Court did not heed this criticism before its ruling in Scott, however,
and it once again focused on the penalty imposed rather than on the fairness
of the trial. 32" ' This has caused a majority of states to condition the
appointment of counsel on the imposition of the punishment, rather than the
necessity of due process for indigent criminals.322 Powell and Gideon do not
countenance such a result.
3 23
The third departure from the rationale in Powell and Gideon concerns
the interpretation of a "loss of liberty. 3 24 Although Argersinger hinted that
"[t]he requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a
petty-offense prosecution," the Court curtailed the line at actual
imprisonment.325 This reasoning contradicts the Court's own philosophy
that "liberty interests extend beyond mere freedom from physical
317. Powell, 287 U.S. at 67 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
318. Simpson, supra note 306, at 422.
319. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
320. Simpson, supra note 306, at 424 (emphasis added).
321. Id. (criticizing the Court for turning "the Sixth Amendment right to counsel on its head").
Simpson went on to say that the "essence of due process is judicial fairness. The right to counsel
was enshrined in the Bill of Rights and in state constitutions to insure that defendants were, in fact,
accorded a fair trial." Id. at 437.
322. Id. at 428.
323. See Adams, supra note 23, at 197 ("[lf the risk of an erroneous decision is sufficiently grave
and such erroneous decision would result in the unjustifiable loss of or damage to the interests
involved, a court must allow representation by appointed counsel even when incarceration is not the
possible end result of the proceeding."); see also Givelber, supra note 14, at 1397 ("Attempting to
limit the right to counsel only to those who are facing particularly severe penalties would reintroduce
the difficulties that characterized Betts v. Brady.").
324. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
325. Id.
[Vol. 31: 609, 20041 Alabama v. Shelton
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
restraint. 3 26 Indeed, the Argersinger and Scott decisions themselves "make
it clear that the basic function of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel is
to guarantee a fair trial in criminal prosecutions in order to protect the
constitutional right of every person to liberty. 3 27 Discarding other losses of
liberty as unimportant enough to require the assistance of appointed counsel
undermines the foundational reasoning of Powell and Gideon.32 ' The right
to counsel has been expanded to include some of these deprivations of
liberty in civil contexts, and there is simply no reason to exclude other
criminal deprivations of liberty when examining the necessity for appointed
counsel in any particular case. 329 Drawing the line at "physical restraint" or
"actual imprisonment" is simply an arbitrary standard that must be modified
if the spirit of Powell and Gideon is to survive. 3 30  This is especially true
when the Court has long recognized that one's liberty interests under the due
process clause encompasses more than simply freedom from physical
restraint.3 3
VI. Is THERE HOPE FOR INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN THE FUTURE?
To suggest that the current state of criminal justice for indigent
defendants is in a state of disrepair would be a gross understatement.332 This
predicament has not been benefited by a presumption within the system that
326. See Catz & Firak, supra note 24, at 408. These losses of liberty include "the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience." Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
327. Respondent's Brief at 9, Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (No. 00- 1214) (emphasis
added).
328. See Powell, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
329. See Catz & Firak, supra note 24, at 415 ("Under the preference currently accorded physical
liberty interests, a drunk driver merits the aid of counsel in a trial that may incarcerate him for a few
days while an indigent parent may be deprived of her child permanently without the assistance of an
attorney."); see also Garcia, supra note 34, at 54 ("The negative consequences stemming from a
conviction may preclude the defendant from performing civic duties, such as serving on a jury, and
may prevent her from obtaining licenses required for certain occupations, not to mention the stigma
which results from a conviction.").
330. See Nelson, supra note 22, at 566 (showing that Justice Brennan, dissenting in the
Argersinger decision, thought its restrictions upon the Sixth Amendment resembled the
anachronistic Betts v. Brady decision).
331. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (defining due process liberty as "not merely
the freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children"); see also Adam D. Young, An Analysis of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel as it
Applies to Suspended Sentences and Probation: Do Argersinger and Scott Blow a Flat Note on
Gideon's Trumpet?, 107 DICK. L. REV. 699, 713 (2003) ("The concept of liberty in the American
criminal justice system far exceeds the single notion of actual imprisonment.").
332. See Lee, supra note 10, at 1918 (1996) (urging that "a presumption of ineffective assistance
of counsel be attached to the legal assistance rendered by the Office of the Public Defender without
inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial").
too many guilty criminals go free.333 The Court has "shifted its focus from
the erroneous convictions that might occur due to lack of funds to the
erroneous acquittals that may be procured by criminals deploying vast
resources." 334 There is a prevailing view that "those who are arrested and
charged with a crime must be guilty-if not of the crime for which they are
charged, then of some other crime," and this makes it "unfair... to ask law
abiding citizens to carry the financial burdens of the lawless." '335 Some have
proposed that cases such as Betts and Scott reflect such a concern. 336 Most
likely, the Supreme Court has treaded lightly on Sixth Amendment ground
in these decisions because they are weary of giving too much power to
indigent defendants, thereby exacerbating this problem. Furthermore, some
recent cases have hinted that "the right to appointed counsel will expand
much more slowly in the future than it has in the past. The 'cutting edge' of
the field has shifted to the enforcement of the existing expanded right.
3 7
The Shelton decision ran contrary to this position. 3 8 It actually enlarged an
indigent defendant's right to appointed counsel.33 9 Is this single opinion
enough to revive the lagging right to court appointed counsel? Some brief
considerations are in order.
A. Risks of Uncounseled Convictions on Both the System and the Defendant
The dangers of leaving a number of uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions intact threaten both the individual defendant and the system.34 °
After Shelton, not all indigent misdemeanor defendants are entitled to court
appointed counsel, and "the consequences of a misdemeanor conviction,
regardless of the sentence imposed, can be far-reaching and devastating for
some people. 341  In addition to the current penalties, an increasingly
complex and regulated society will continue to produce added and even
unintended consequences for misdemeanor convictions.342
The failure to provide an adequate defense for the nation's indigent
misdemeanants can have a severe impact on society at large.3 43  "Any
333. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing
Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 723 (1992) (discussing a recent trend in the
courts that views defense lawyers as scheming advocates instead of a "shield of weak and possibly
innocent individuals").
334. Id. at 671.
335. Lee, supra note 10, at 1925-26.
336. Karlan, supra note 333, at 672.
337. See Catz & Firak, supra note 24, at 438.
338. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
339. See id.
340. See generally Cait Clarke, The Right to Counsel: Gideon v. Wainwright at 40: Contemporary
Issues: Taking Alabama v. Shelton to Heart, 27 Champion 25 (2003)
341. Catz & Firak, supra note 24, at 437.
342. Id. at 438.
343. One commentator has suggested that these misdemeanor convictions "often reflect social
problems inside specific geographic communities or demographic groups. Large numbers of minor
cases can be a source of important data and insight into the health of a community. Problems, such
as addiction, could be addressed early, before these problems become intractable." Clarke, supra
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diminution in the rights of the indigent results in a proportional diminution
and erosion of the rights of all persons. No one benefits if one side has more
resources than the other."'3 " This failure to promote equality in the courts
also encourages the public perception that "the rich go free and the poor go
to jail. 345 Simply stated, the situation in public defenders' offices across the
country is one "ripe for abuse, and it is folly to think that those abuses and
consequences do not extend beyond the lives of those many unfortunate
defendants who sorely need but who are denied the appointment of
counsel.,
346
These damaging effects of uncounseled indigent convictions on the
public at large are joined by harrowing truths about the effects on individual
criminals:
While... severe penalties have been injected into our criminal
justice system, we provide only the most cursory defense services to
the poor. Public defender budgets are routinely slashed to the bare
bone. Lawyers who serve the poor zealously strive to provide
effective legal representation, yet they are overrun by the superior
resources of law enforcement and the Government. The lack of
funding for defense services for the poor makes a mockery of
justice.347
In certain jurisdictions the courts are unable to provide counsel even
when it is constitutionally required.3 48  States are often unable to provide
adequate funding to assure effective representation, and public defender
systems are often underfunded while at the same time handling caseloads
that exceed the maximum limits set by national guidelines. 349  "In the
note 340, at 27. In addition, "[m]isdemeanor cases often present the best opportunity to engage
restorative justice initiatives. Rehabilitation and restitution can be most acceptable and effective for
minor offenses." Id.
344. Lee, supra note 10, at 1926.
345. See id. at 1896.
346. Francis D. Doucette, Non -Appointment of Counsel in Indigent Criminal Cases. A Case Study,
31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 495, 513 (1997); see also Clarke, supra note 340, at 27. ("Defenders should
'sweat the small stuff because it is the most fertile area for defenders and community leaders to
collaborate on problem-solving justice initiatives.").
347. Liotti, supra note 28, at 105-06.
348. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon has No Clothes. The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 657-63
(1986) (citing several nationwide studies showing that "[t]he scope of representation provided for
indigent defendants in many jurisdictions does not meet specific constitutional directives of the
Supreme Court"); see also Judith Kapuscinski, Beyond 'Gideon': 25 Years Later, the Right to
Counsel is Not Always Assured, L.A. DAILY J., April 1, 1988, at 4 (observing national studies
indicating that this constitutional violation occurs especially with misdemeanor offenses).
349. Stacchini, supra note 316, at 1248-49 nn.l 11-17; see also James Kura, Prove You Need the
Money, Public Defenders Should Use Caseload Data to Raise Funds and Influence People, 4 SPG
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misdemeanor courtrooms, lawyers may be responsible for 25 to 35 clients a
day. 350 Since the Gideon decision, "a major independent report has been
issued at least every five years documenting the severe deficiencies in
indigent defense services. '35' Some states allocate significantly more
funding to the prosecution offices than to the indigent defense offices.352
The meager funds received by public defenders are sometimes reduced by
judges "who seem to retaliate against them for being strong advocates. 353
Furthermore, "every state and the federal government has enacted a
statutory recovery system designed to recoup all or some of the costs
associated with the government's constitutional obligation to provide
counsel to indigent criminal defendants. '354  Under this system, indigent
defendants, who do not have any discretion in choosing their own counsel,
must "repay all or a portion of the costs of their legal defense when they
subsequently obtain the means to do so. ' 355 The effect of this process is to
require "the indigent to pay the piper without extending any real authority to
call the tune. 356
Under the current system, "a drunk driver merits the aid of counsel in a
trial that may incarcerate him for a few days while an indigent parent may be
deprived of her child permanently without the assistance of an attorney. 357
While this loss of a child may take place in the context of a civil trial, the
underlying concern is still the same. The statistics cited above demonstrate
CRIM. JUST. 20, 21 (1989) (stating that in some jurisdictions, public defenders are now appointed to
eighty percent of all criminal cases).
350. Stone, supro note 16, at 215. Further statistics from the Cook County Public Defender's
Office in Chicago are not heartwarming: a single attorney may be required to handle over four
hundred pending clients in the juvenile division, over one hundred pending cases in the felony
division, and "over 20 pending murder cases at any given time." See id.
351. Harvard Law Review, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of
Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2000) (recalling stories of "intoxicated, sleeping,
and otherwise incompetent public defenders").
352. Stacchini, supra note 316, at 1252. In 1999, prosecutors' offices nationwide had total
budgets of over $4.6 billion for prosecutorial functions. Half of the offices reported an annual
budget of $318,000 or more. The average budget was $2 million. This can be contrasted with the
twenty-one states whose state government funds virtually all indigent defense services. These
twenty-one states account for 27% of the U.S. population in 1999. They spent a total of $662
million on indigent defense. In 1999, an estimated $1.2 billion was spent to provide indigent
defense services to the nation's 100 most populous counties. These statistics can be found at
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf and www.ojp.usdof.gov/bjs/id.htm#counties.
353. Liotti, supra note 28, at 106. The current pay rate for these overworked defenders is just as
disappointing. In New York State, hourly fees for those willing to represent indigent defendants has
"increased only twice since 1965." Id. at 124. It has not been increased since 1986. Id. The current
rate is "forty dollars per hour for in-court time and twenty-five dollars per hour for out-of-court
time." Id. The statutory cap is $1,200 for felony cases and $800 for misdemeanor cases. Id. Some
solutions to these problems have popped up occasionally. See Clarke, supra note 340, at 26
("Defenders can get local governments to think about diversion and alternatives to incarceration or
to decriminalize certain conduct. Enforcing Shelton does not necessarily have to result in increased
costs and burdens on the criminal justice system or county budgets.") (quoting Robert C.
Boruchowitz, the Executive Director of the King County Public Defender Association in Seattle).
354. Holly, supra note 27, at 218 (citing State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 104 (Alaska 1995)).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 230.
357. Catz & Firak, supra note 24, at 415.
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that the indigent criminal defendant is victimized by a system that fails to
meet constitutional standards, cares nothing for the level of representation
they receive, subjects them to fees for this empty advocacy, and altogether
ignores the guarantees that all criminal defendants are afforded under the
Due Process Clause. There is certainly room for improvement.358
B. Proposed Solutions and Their Risks
There have been three main types of programs evolving throughout the
country that attempt to provide legal services to the indigent accused:
(1) assigned counsel programs where lawyers who are members of
the private bar are appointed on a case-by-case basis; (2) contract
attorney programs where the local government contracts with
individual private attorneys, law firms, or bar associations to
provide representation to certain categories of defendants over a
specific period of time; and (3) public defender programs where a
salaried staff of full-time or part-time attorneys provide defense
services.35 9
Each system has its share of risks and benefits. While the contract system
may attract very capable attorneys from the private bar, usually the
government funds "the lowest bidder to provide representation to a...
number.., of indigent defendants for a certain period .... The economic
incentive is for that lawyer or ... lawyers to dispose of as many cases as
quickly as possible to maximize profit.
' 360
The federal government has relied almost exclusively on the assigned
counsel program, but this has brought problems of "fixing appropriate levels
of compensation, inadequate training and supervision, [and the] absence of
358. Interestingly enough, public confidence in the American criminal justice system appears to
have remained steady since the mid-1990s. According to the Department of Justice, the percentage
of Americans who have "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the criminal justice system
has ranged between 17-24% from 1993-2000. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 106 (2000).
359. See Stone, supra note 16, at 209- 10. Of the twenty-one states that depend solely on the state
government to provide all of their indigent defense services, nineteen provide indigent defense
services through assigned counsel. Ten had a roster of private attorneys who could be appointed to
represent indigent criminal defendants. Five of those ten had formal procedures for removing
attorneys from the roster. Eleven states had funded contract attorney programs administered to
Public Defender offices, law firm, solo practitioners, non-profit organizations, or groups of private
attorneys or law firms. Five states reported competitive bidding for indigent criminal defense
services. Indigent defense service programs in the largest 100 counties received an estimated 4.2
million cases in 1999. Of these cases, 82% were handled by court appointed private attorneys, 15%
by private attorneys, and 3% by contract attorneys. These statistics can be found at
www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf. and www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/id.htm#counties.
360. Stone, supra note 16, at 210.
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minimum standards of performance. '3 61 In addition, there has been some
criticism that the assigned counsel system constitutes a taking under the
Fifth Amendment.362
Public defender systems featuring a full-time staff of attorneys working
with a fixed salary tend to offer the best hope of unreserved representation,
but in practice insufficient funding and excessive caseloads can seriously
diminish the quality of services.363
Another rather extreme proposal is that state and federal governments
adopt legislation that requires all criminal defendants, underprivileged and
over-privileged, to be represented by counsel that is appointed by the
court.364 This would ensure the actuality and appearance of equal justice.365
Defendants would no longer be able to "buy their way out. ' 366 The public
would be more amenable to funding for criminal defendants because of their
confidence in the system.367 Middle-class defendants who do not meet the
stringent standards for indigency but don't have the resources for a proper
defense could acquire decent representation "without having to jeopardize
essential family resources. 368
It is clear that the legal profession will need help from a wide range of
attorneys, both public and private, to enact a system that will truly benefit
indigent defendants. 369  The sacrifices that individual attorneys will be
compelled to make have everlasting nobility when seen in context. The
decision to take a pay cut in order to keep constitutional freedoms alive is
never a regrettable one. With the implementation of one or a combination of
these proposals, the wasteland of indigent criminal defense might be
transformed into an effective pool of capable advocates ready and willing to
work towards a system worthy of being a productive part of the American
criminal justice system. By carefully reviewing a number of these solutions,
or by diligently laboring to find a better one, our nation's governmental
agencies might be able to provide indigent criminal defendants with the
361. Id.
362. See Stafford Henderson Byers, Article: Delivering Indigents' Right to Counsel While
Respecting Lawyers' Right to Their Profession: A System "Between a Rock and a Hard Place", 13
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 491, 513-15 (1999); see also George A. Riemer, Can Oregon
Lawyers be Compelled to Represent Indigents for Free?, 63 OR. ST. B. BULL. 21, 21 (2002)
(warning that "[l]awyers and judges need to start thinking about the legal, ethical and practical
implications of trying to force bar members to represent indigents when the state says it no longer
has any money to pay for such representation").
363. See Stone, supra note 16, at 210-11.
364. See Clark, supra note 9, at 52.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 53.
368. Id.
369. Some have suggested that simply "[enforcing Shelton will be a long uphill battle. Litigation
will likely be necessary in some states and counties, but lawsuits should not be initiated by public
defense organizations. Challenges to systemic inequities and constitutional violations should be left
to organizations like the ACLU." Clarke, supra note 340, at 27. Aside from litigation, Clarke
recommends that defenders themselves take an active role in "educating all players about the Shelton
decision." Id. at 28. "In their meetings with local officials and community leaders, defenders should
raise the issue with everyone and anyone who will listen." Id.
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representation they are constitutionally entitled to. The first step, however,
is to grant each accused, regardless of their bank account, the simple
opportunity to appear in court with an attorney by their side. This result
cannot be waitlisted any longer.
VII. THE VERDICT ON THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Despite the Sixth Amendment's explicit language, the United States
Supreme Court has been reluctant, decade after decade, to incorporate the
full guarantees of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment's
protections on the states.37 ° The evolving standards that outline precisely
what Due Process requires on behalf of the states in providing indigent
defendants with appointed counsel have developed with the speed of a tired
tortoise.7 The proudly pronounced Powell v. Alabama372 and Gideon v.
Wainwright73 decisions, extending the right to appointed counsel, have
retained only a glimpse of their potency.374 The powerful due process
370. The Court in Scott v. Illinois stated:
[W]e conclude today that Argersinger did indeed delimit the constitutional right to
appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings. Even were the matter res nova, we
believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that actual imprisonment is a penalty
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and
warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to
appointment of counsel.
440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942) ("The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in
the Sixth Amendment."). The Court was at least a little more willing to extend Sixth Amendment
protection to indigent defendants in criminal cases, as the Johnson v. Zerbst decision makes clear.
304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ("The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or
waives the assistance of counsel.").
371. Powell v. Alabama, the first case requiring the states to appoint a lawyer to an indigent
defendant in accordance with the Due Process Clause, was decided in 1932. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Ten years later, the Court determined that the Due Process Clause did not require an appointment of
a lawyer to an indigent criminal defendant in state court unless "want of counsel in a particular case
may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness." Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473
(1942). It was another twenty years until the Court recognized the right of appointed counsel to all
indigent defendants in felony cases. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963). Nine
years later, this was extended to convictions which resulted in a defendant's loss of liberty.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). This was limited in scope by Scott v. Illinois seven
years later. 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). Twenty-two years later, Alabama v. Shelton provided a very
small extension by holding that even suspended prison sentences could not be imposed at an
uncounseled trial. 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002). Thus, it has taken the Supreme Court seventY years to
adjudicate the "fundamental fairness" mandated under the Due Process Clause includes the provision
of the guiding hand of counsel before an indigent defendant can be sentenced to a suspended prison
term.
372. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
373. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
374. See Garcia, supra note 34, at 57 (lamenting that "the course charted by the Court in the mid-
1970s and the 1980s differed from that followed by Gideon, Douglas, and Argersinger. 'Practical'
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language in those opinions, suggesting that the right to appointed counsel is
a fundamental right necessary to ensure a fair trial, as well as the importance
given to this right by this country's founders, has given way to judicial haste
and budgetary concerns.
3 75
Despite the Supreme Court's lack of eagerness to extend the indigent
criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel, diamonds in the rough
appear every so often. Alabama v. Shelton is one of these diamonds. The
Shelton decision extended the right to counsel in a way that was entirely
consistent with the Court's prior case precedent. It pushed the threshold
constitutional requirements on the states' appointment of counsel to indigent
defendants just a little bit further. But it was far from adequate. Although
Shelton was a step in the right direction, the great liberties of the Sixth
Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
remain stifled because of the Supreme Court's hesitancy to allow the Sixth
Amendment to mean what it says: the right to the assistance of counsel in all
criminal prosecutions. This would include prosecutions against the educated
and uneducated, the rich and the poor, those charged with felonies and
misdemeanors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The logic of Powell and Gideon remains unrealized at best, and flat out
ignored at the worst. The Court has extended the right to appointed counsel
only in situations where the defendant may lose his or her liberty. This has
been interpreted to include only loss of "physical liberty," but loss of one's
liberty no longer merely refers to jail sentences. The wide array of criminal
penalties in contemporary penal codes can ruin a career, destroy a family,
label one a "sexual predator," take away the opportunity to vote, take away a
driver's license, and attach social stigmas that can never be erased.376 These
harsh consequences can no longer be justified when imposed after an
unreliable and uncounseled conviction in criminal court. To do so offends
all notions of due process and contradicts the rational behind Powell and
Gideon.
Instead of an inch-by-inch approach to this fundamental constitutional
right, the Court must forge ahead. Both reason and precedent point to a
concerns suddenly loomed large against the ideal of fairness Gideon and its progeny sought to
promote."). More than one commentator has noticed that, although "professing fidelity for the
'fundamental right' to counsel, the Court's recent jurisprudence reflects a different understanding of
the function of counsel in the criminal process ... one which construed the right of the defendant to
counsel as a revocable privilege rather than a fundamental right." Id. at 103; see also Simpson,
supra note 306, at 424 (explaining that the Argersinger decision, which limited the right to
appointed counsel only in cases where the defendant is sentenced to jail, "blurred the clear purpose
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: to insure a fair trial for the accused, regardless of the
nature of the offense charged and its penalty").
375. See Garcia, supra note 34, at 105 ("It appears that the United States Supreme Court has lost
sight of [James] Madison's goal in securing the enactment of the Bill of Rights. In particular, the
right to counsel has foundered on the shoals of political expediency.").
376. See Garcia, supra note 34, at 54.
658
[Vol. 31: 609, 2004] Alabama v. Shelton
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
more liberal understanding of the indigent's right to appointed counsel.
There are many proposals, but only one solid solution: give the Sixth
Amendment the reverence it deserves. The language of the amendment is
clear, and political or financial concerns cannot impede the necessary
development of constitutional guarantees. The Court itself has said that a
"State's fiscal interest is ... irrelevant" where the denial of the constitutional
rights of due process and equal protection is concerned.377 Every financially
secure criminal defendant enjoys the assistance of counsel; those less
fortunate must not settle for anything less.
Joshua S. Stambaugh378
377. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1971).
378. Student, Pepperdine University School of Law (.D. candidate, Spring 2004). I would like to
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